

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1217753-1

Total Deleted Page(s) = 2  
Page 144 ~ b1; b3;  
Page 145 ~ b1; b3;

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~~SECRET~~

By letter dated 8-7-47 he submitted his resignation to be effective 8-22-47; because of personal and family considerations which he felt he could no longer disregard.

On 8-22-47 Mr. Coyne rated him EXCELLENT and said that for some period of time he had been handling espionage and intelligence matters. He had functioned in an above average manner as a Bureau Supervisor, he was intelligent, aggressive, and he had an outstanding knowledge of the subject matters to which he had been assigned. He was mature, experienced, dependable and resourceful. In addition to being a thoroughly loyal employee, it should be noted that he, over the years, had put in a tremendous amount of voluntary overtime in an endeavor to generally enhance the handling of the work to which he was assigned. By an attached memorandum Mr. Ladd stated that he desired to point out that Mr. Harvey had an excellent knowledge of Russian espionage and Communist activities and was superior in his presentation of that work to the various training classes. Indicative of this was the comments made by numerous Special Agents to Mr. Ladd after having heard Mr. Harvey's lectures. In a letter from SAC Hood dated 8-14-47, referring to the special Russian Espionage School, he made the following comment; "While the Agents felt that all of the lecturers seemed entirely conversant with the matters discussed, they were unanimous in advising that that portion of the program handled by Special Agent William Harvey was outstanding; that his grasp of the details of Russian espionage operations in this country was a revelation to most Agents in the class."

His resignation was accepted effective 8-22-47, having been acknowledged by letter dated 8-13-47.

Communication dated 9-30-47 from the Central Intelligence Group reflected that he had entered on duty with that organization on 9-29-47. *SI (S) (U) per CIA let - 9-16-43 PW 06A Let. 9-2-43 Pro 4 Remind (U) - AUC 60290 Rec'd Aug 1 65 981541 267/89*

By memorandum dated 3-21-49 Mr. Glavin advised Mr. Tolson that the records of the Bureau indicated that Former Agent Harvey and several other Agents were assigned reports in the Smedley Case for the period from 2-6-46 to 10-16-47. In addition, he was acting #1 Man of the Espionage Section for a considerable period of time. Regarding delinquencies in handling Agnes Smedley and Gunther Stein cases, Mr. Harvey was responsible as the #1 Man of the Espionage Section for the unassignment of the Smedley Case from the standpoint of supervision for a considerable period of time, since he merely assigned reports rather than cases to individual supervisors for review. Supervisory delinquencies reflected no file review including cross references and no summary of these references, failure to institute several basic investigative steps, failure to point out to the field the inadequacy of their investigative coverage, failure to follow on delays in the submission of reports by the field. This former Agent bears the brunt of the responsibility for the haphazard assignment of the supervision of the Smedley case during the period of time he was #1 Man in the Security Division. He issued instructions to certain of the Special Agent Supervisors to review the reports which were delinquent, initial them, get them into the file and a thorough review of the cases would be made when they were assigned to individual supervisors. There did not appear to be any excuse for instructions of this kind being issued. It was felt that that was the time when substantive supervisory work could have been performed on that and other cases, the identities of which were not known at that time. It was recommended that the inadequate supervision be borne in mind in case any inquiries were received concerning Harvey in the future.

~~SECRET~~

b1 Per CIA  
b3

9-2-03 Pmt (Remainder) - A/c 602903CE/dy/13 # 961541

9-16-03 (P) PMA 404, H. 9-2-03 F3 / vol 2 no (U) - AUC 60240 (C) (d) (b) #98154/

By memorandum dated 2/23/50 Mr. Keay stated that Harvey had telephonically contacted the Liaison Section on 2/17/50 and advised that personnel of the Office of Special Operations, CIA, were interested in obtaining information concerning the FBI Agents Insurance Fund. He advised that he and former Agent [redacted] desired to start such a fund for the personnel of that

~~SECRET~~

Page 4 Remarib3 Per CIA  
AUC 60240 BCS/Dec 152  
#981541

~~SECRET~~

(S) Agency. In connection with that matter, he was subsequently advised that the Bureau contacted numerous insurance Agents and advisors for information in establishing the FBI fund. It was suggested that Harvey contact appropriate insurance company representatives since different problems confronted CIA than those confronting the Bureau.

5-1(X) U - 9-16-03 Pw OBA Let. dtd. 9-2-03 [ ] Pw 1, 2, 3 (U) - AUC 60290 BCE/dag/bb #981541 b3 Per CIA  
During June, 1950, the Central Intelligence Agency alleged that there had not been a reciprocal exchange of information on matters of mutual interest between the FBI and CIA and a specific incident of lack of cooperation in connection with the [ ] was cited. By letter dated 6/28/50 the Bureau pointed out to the Central Intelligence Agency that the information in question had been furnished to them on 1/17/50 under the caption [ ]

[ ] The Bureau also referred to the implication of other instances in which the Bureau had not cooperated and ask to be advised of specific cases. (S) (X) per CIA Let 7/7/59 - 9-16-03 Pw OBA Let. dtd. 9-2-03 [ ]'s pgs 2

Remain Classified (S) - AUC 60290 BCE/dag/bb #981541  
In connection with the above-mentioned allegations, by memorandum dated 7/10/50 Mr. Keay advised that Mr. DeLoach had called upon Admiral Hillenkoetter of CIA and mentioned to him that the Bureau had not been advised of the other alleged instances of lack of cooperation. Admiral Hillenkoetter stated that he sincerely regretted that he had been extremely busy on the day the letter charging lack of cooperation went out from his office and that he had signed it without reading it. He further advised that former Agent Harvey had prepared the letter and it was now evident that Harvey had no proof or background upon which to base his charges, that apparently Harvey was grasping at a straw to bring charges against the FBI. Hillenkoetter stated he knew of no instances of failure to cooperate on the part of the FBI and he intended to censure both Harvey and [ ] for their participation in the matter. (S) (X) (U) per CIA Let 7/7/59 - 9-16-03 Pw OBA Let. dtd. 9-2-03 Pw 3

Remain (U) - AUC 60290 BCE/dag/bb #981541 b3 Per CIA  
By memorandum dated 8/2/50 Mr. Ladd reported that Mr. DeLoach had called upon Admiral Hillenkoetter of Central Intelligence and advised him that the Bureau felt former Agent Harvey was unfriendly and hostile toward the Bureau and the Bureau would prefer to have Liaison relations with another individual. Hillenkoetter expressed surprise and indicated he felt Harvey had leaned over backwards to promote a spirit of cooperation between the FBI and CIA and further stated it was unfortunate that Harvey possessed a most ambitious and forceful personality which at times made letters written by him pointed and sarcastic. He stated that at time it had been necessary to "tone down" letters written by Harvey; however, it was not felt Harvey had intentionally caused any dissension. In connection with this matter on 8/3/50 Mr. Ladd reported that Harvey called at the Bureau in connection with the Bureau's displeasure at his attitude. He pointed out that he had initiated the letter regarding lack of cooperation on the part of the FBI but he didn't write it and failed to read it; he pointed out he had stopped other letters which were

- 7 ~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

somewhat critical of the Bureau and he would continue to do so in order to permit closer relationship; that he felt no hostility toward the Bureau and had the highest regard for the Bureau. The Director was advised of Harvey's comments and he indicated that liaison arrangements with Harvey could continue to determine whether his attitude was as he had indicated. ~~SA (X)(U)~~ RUCIAL 3/7/54

By memorandum dated 8/18/51 Mr. Ladd reported that in connection with the case "Israel Halperin, Espionage - R, the Domestic Intelligence Division was seriously derelict in two respects: (1) failure to make a complete search of Bureau files on all the names of individuals appearing in the Halperin notebooks (2) failure to make inquiry concerning those individuals not indicated as residing in this country. It was pointed out this matter was then being handled under the supervision of former Agent William Harvey. (among the entries in the Halperin notebooks appeared the name of Klaus Fuchs) The Director noted, "be certain his (Harvey's) personnel file reflects this."

Pursuant to the Director's instructions, on 11-27-51 there was prepared for him a detailed brief regarding former FBI Agents whom the Bureau dealt with at that time, and whom the Bureau would deal with in the future at CIA. ~~SA (X)(U)~~ Former SA Harvey's record was included in this brief. The Director noted, "It is regrettable that not one of these ex-agents with whom we come into contact in our dealings with CIA had a clear record either while in FBI or an attitude of good will toward FBI after leaving it. I cannot help but concluding that much of the difficulty with CIA has been engendered by this group. We should be alert to it and each one in FBI who has to have contacts here or in the Field with CIA should be briefed as to background of any of the above with whom they may come in contact. H." - 9-16-53 P.O. 6A Let. dtd. 9-16-53 RUCIAL b3 Per CIA

Memorandum dated 7-1-52 reflected a limited discussion was to be had with William K. Harvey, Chief of the Planning Staff of the Office of Special Operations of CIA, and [redacted] head of a unit in CIA which was engaged in doing work on communications intelligence, on Bureau Source 5 cases. In answer to the Director's inquiry regarding the background of these two men, briefs were prepared concerning them for his use. It was noted the Bureau had, in the past, had some difficulty with Harvey at CIA; however, recently his attitude had been friendly and cooperative. The Director stated, "As to Harvey I doubt if he has ever changed his basic hostility towards the FBI." - 9-16-53 P.O. 6A Let. dtd. 9-2-53 [redacted] per [redacted] RUCIAL 3/7/54

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson from Mr. Mohr dated 9-30-52 reflected that CIA was most anxious to recruit into its service key FBI personnel and it was rumored there were two individuals within the CIA who were particularly anxious to do so. One was former SA William K. Harvey. It was understood he would utilize any device to proselyte former Bureau personnel and would even go so far as to approach former Bureau personnel presently with CIA to go out and make contact with present and former Bureau employees to entice them with offers of higher grades to go to CIA. The Director noted, "There is absolutely no question but there is a very definite and intensive effort being made by CIA to proselyte key Bureau personnel & they are approaching our staff in violation of all agreements & decency. H." RUCIAL 3/7/54

9-14-53 P.O. 6A Let. dtd. 9-2-53 [redacted] per 4  
AUC 60290 PCE/ded (U) #98154/ -8-

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Memorandum dated 1-22-54 reflected that former SA Harvey on 3-5-46 prepared a summary memorandum entitled "Cinrad, Internal Security - R." containing information indicating that J. Robert Oppenheimer told General Leslie Groves, former head of Manhattan Engineering District, in March, 1944, that only Frank Oppenheimer was approached for information concerning the Manhattan Engineering District Project. The approach was made in the Fall of 1941. There was no documentation or source indicated for this data in the Cinrad memorandum of 3-5-46. The Bureau was unable to locate the original source or any reference reporting involvement of Frank Oppenheimer. Apparently former SA Harvey received the information orally and failed to make a record of it. It was recommended and approved a copy of <sup>this</sup> memorandum be placed in Harvey's personnel file. <sup>b1 Per CIA</sup>  
b3

By letter dated 10-22-58, the Legal Attaches of London, Madrid, Paris, Rome, and Bonn were alerted to Harvey's unfriendly and hostile attitude toward the Bureau and were instructed to be most circumspect in any contact with him.

9-2-63  
9-2-63

9-16-03 PHU Oba Let. dtd. 9-2-03 pma 5 (U) - AUC 60280 BCE/12/52 #981541

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. LADD

DATE: September 11, 1947

FROM : E. G. FITCH

SUBJECT : WILLIAM K. HARVEY  
Former Special Agent

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Colonel Galloway, CIG, advised that CIG has made an offer of employment to the above named individual which offer is subject to security clearance by CIG.

Colonel Galloway advised that Mr. Harvey went to him seeking employment and advised that he had resigned from this Bureau and was no longer an employee of the FBI. Colonel Galloway stated that because of the agreement existing with the Director of the FBI, he would not have spoken to Mr. Harvey without his first being assured that he was no longer employed by this Bureau.

An effort was made to determine the grade, salary and type of work to be done by Mr. Harvey with negative results.

JFD:ONE

RECEIVED BY 275 mcl/hg  
5-11-89  
per CFA 2-7-89

Classified by 5N3-26-70  
Declassify on: OADR 10/5/82  
100 (10)

ALL INFORMATION ON THIS  
PAGE IS CLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
4 FEB 18 1988

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : W. R. GLAVIN

DATE: 9/24/47

FROM : H. L. EDWARDS

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SUBJECT: WILLIAM KING HARVEY

[Central Intelligence Group - Applicant]

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. E. A. Tamm	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Coffey	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Carson	_____
Mr. Hendon	_____
Mr. Mumford	_____
Mr. Jones	_____
Mr. Quinn Tamm	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Bahr	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

The Investigative Division has requested that they be furnished with the service record of the captioned former employee of this Bureau in order that it may be made available to the [Central Intelligence Group.] (S)(U)

The requested information is set out in the attached memorandum and it is recommended that it be forwarded to the Investigative Division.

RECORDED

67-

101

Attachment

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

JEE:dj

DECLASSIFIED BY 275  
DATE 11-8-89  
per CIA let 2-7-89

Classified by SP-6 BAF/mde  
Declassify on: OADR 2/7/86

Searched \_\_\_\_\_  
Numbered \_\_\_\_\_  
Filed \_\_\_\_\_

6 OCT 18 1947

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

THREE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

October 11, 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b3 Per CIA

[Redacted]  
Central Intelligence Group  
2450 E Street, Northwest  
Washington, D. C.

X u

(Dear [Redacted])

(X) u

In accordance with the request contained in your letter of September 30, 1947, there is transmitted herewith the Official Personnel Folder of Mr. William K. Harvey, a former employee of this Bureau whose resignation was effective at the close of business August 22, 1947.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

Enclosure  
REGISTERED

Classified by SP6 [Redacted]  
Declassify on: OADR 2/21/86

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
MAILED 3  
OCT 11 1947 P.M.  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

102  
OCT 22 1947  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

497985  
RECORDED

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

JW/nl

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEB 18 1986

*[Handwritten signature]*

Central Intelligence Group  
2430 "E" Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C.

30 September 1947

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
9th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.  
TO: Attention: Mr. H.L. Edwards, Personnel Officer

Attached hereto is Standard Form 50 on  
William K. Harvey who entered on duty  
with this organization 29 September 1947.

Please forward Official Personnel Folder as  
outlined in Federal Personnel Manual, Chapter R-1.

It is requested that the Official Personnel  
Folder be forwarded to:

Central Intelligence Group  
Attention: Mr. Edwin M. Terrell  
2430 "E" Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

RECORDED

CS

*Transmit 201 file  
10-11-47  
arg/mc*

*Edwin M. Terrell*  
EDWIN M. TERRELL

67-168897-103	
Searched	.....
Numbered	.....
Filed	.....
5 OCT 22 1947	
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	

OCT 28 1947

9-16-03 Per OBA Let. dtd. 9-2-03 thru info this pg. to (4) - AUC 60290/SC/BJ/SS  
#981541  
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 8-18-03 BY AUC 60290/SC/BJ/SS  
#981541

APR 30 1986

FEB 18 1986

MAY 25 1983

*Ruth Wood*

9-16-43 Pw OGA Let. dtd. 9-2-43 *this info this page (4) -*  
*AUC 60290 BCE/dg/ks*  
*#981541*  
8-18-43 *AUC 60290 BCE/dg/ks*  
*#981541*

Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.  
23 October 1947

Mr. H.L. Edwards, Personnel Officer  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
9th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

The official Personnel Folder, requested 30 September by this Agency on Mr. William K. Harvey, has been received. However, an official transcript of leave record was not included.

It is requested that the official transcript of leave record be forwarded to the undersigned in order that our records may be complete.

Very truly yours,

*E. M. Terrell*

05

E.M. TERRELL

67-168897-104	
Searched	22
Numbered	22
Filed	1
4 OCT 31 1947	
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	

ENT/gev

RECORDED & INDEXED SECTION
MAILED 8
4 OCT 30 1947 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

10/30/47  
#1137-see back  
as to serial and  
reference  
no report  
1947  
APR 20 1947

FEB 18 1980



OFFICE MEMORANDUM

\*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. GLAVIN

DATE: December 21, 1948

FROM : D. M. Ladd

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: FORMER SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED]

b1 Per CIA  
b3~~SECRET~~

As a matter of record it might be noted that former Special Agent [REDACTED] informed me today confidentially that he was going to be put in charge of the [REDACTED] in June or July and that former Special Agent William K. Harvey would be transferred to the desk which [REDACTED] occupying at CIA. (~~S~~)(~~A~~)(~~X~~)

b1 Per CIA  
b3

DML:dad

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1)  
DATE 01-08-2016 BY: F76M45K62

Classified by ~~5/1-89~~ 275 wew/aj  
Declassify on: OADR  
Per CIA Let 2/7/89

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Classified by ~~5/1-89~~ 322/mk  
Declassify on: OADR 2/7/86  
is Auth & Subject

9-16-03 Per OADR Let 2/7/86

8-18-03

AUC 60290 PCE/dag/SL

# 981541 as amended

12 JAN 11 1949

FOI/PA	267,100
APPROX	
CIVILIAN	
E.O.	12356
DATE	2/27/86 INITIALS/mk

(S) is CIA (S)

~~SECRET~~

REF: OADR  
FEB 18 1986

RE: WILLIAM K. HARVEY

~~SECRET~~

reports which were delinquent, initial them, get them into the file and a thorough review of the cases would be made when they were assigned to individual supervisors. There does not appear to be any excuse for instructions of this kind being issued. I feel that this was the time when substantive supervisory work could have been performed on this and other cases, the identities of which are not known at this time.

I concur in the recommendation made by Mr. Clegg concerning this former Agent with the further proviso that this inadequate supervision be borne in mind in the case any inquiries are received concerning Harvey in the future.

[Harvey is now with CIA] (~~S~~)(~~A~~)u  
←

I concur.

H.

~~SECRET~~

copy for

~~SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1,6)  
DATE 12-30-2015 BY: F76M45K62

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. H. B. Fletcher

DATE : May 4, 1949

FROM : V. . Reay

SUBJECT : ESTABLISHMENT OF CIA REPRESENTATIVE

b1 Per CIA  
b3

Reference is made to my memorandum to Mr. Fletcher, dated May 2, 1949, wherein it was noted that CIA contemplated assigning former Bureau Agent [redacted] as a CIA representative in [redacted]. Referenced memorandum also included the fact that [redacted] specifically recommended to that he could "properly handle" [redacted] in entree into the [redacted] using [redacted] as a "stepping stone" that the Bureau's liaison representative to CIA had ascertained that William K. Harvey, also a former Bureau Agent and now a minor official of CIA had advised his superiors that [redacted] had a "peculiar personality," and, therefore, it would take a good liaison man to handle him properly.

b1 Per CIA  
b3

b1 Per CIA  
b3

The Director noted as follows: "What is record of [redacted] while with us? The attached letter is unsatisfactory. I don't like its evasiveness. Please rewrite. H."

Attached will be found a brief prepared by the Chief Clerk's Office reflecting former Agent [redacted]'s record with this Bureau. With respect to the Director's second notation, the attached letter has been prepared pursuant to his instructions.

ACTION:

If approved, it is suggested that the attached letter be forwarded to the Bureau representative [redacted].

b1 Per CIA  
b3

Attachment

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

87-0868  
275 wad / ag 8/7/58  
Classified by Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: OADR 2/7/86

CCD:hko

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED  
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)  
DATE: 5-8-91

FORM # 267,100  
APPROVAL  
CIVIL ACT. #  
E.C. # 12356  
DATE 2/27/86 INITIALS mde

[redacted] is CIA [redacted] (u)

~~SECRET~~

KERO  
FEB 18 1986

May 4, 1949

~~SECRET~~

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AIR MAIL


b1 Per CIA  
b3

TO:



From: Director, FBI

SUBJECT: APPOINTMENT OF CIA  
LIAISON REPRESENTATIVE



Classified by *[initials]*

Declassify on: OADR 2/1/89

b1 Per CIA  
b3

Reference is made to your letter dated March 28, 1949 wherein you advised that the

requested any corrections and would like to be kept relative to this matter.

As you know, the Bureau, of course, can make no objection to the establishment of such liaison. For your confidential information, however,



b1 Per CIA  
b3

For your further information, it has been ascertained that CIA is presently considering one Samuel Herman Horton, a former Bureau agent and now an employee of the Office of Special Operations, CIA, for the position in question. Horton entered the Bureau as a Special Agent on January 15, 1940. He was assigned to the Richmond and Cincinnati Offices and was transferred to the Seat of Government on June 28, 1943. He resigned on December 1, 1944 to accept a position with the Office of Strategic Services.

It has additionally been ascertained that William K. Harvey, also a former Bureau agent and now a member official of CIA, has recommended to his superior that only a former Special Agent of the FBI should be placed in so that he will have interest in common with him and thereby gain your

b1 Per CIA  
b3

CC - Foreign Service Desk

GDD:mk

~~CLASSIFIED DECISION~~  
DATE: 5-8-91

FOI/PA #	267,110
APPROVAL	
CIVIL ACT. #	
E.O. #	12356
DATE	2/27/86

(S) in CIA (S)(u)

~~SECRET~~

FEB 18 1966

~~SECRET~~

[confidence and use you as an entree with the [redacted] of other excellent bureau contacts. The recommendation was also specifically made that "Due to your peculiar personality, [redacted] and [redacted] representative [redacted] because of his so-called "ability" to handle [redacted], meaning of course, that he is expected to cultivate and properly handle you for the benefit of [redacted]. It is therefore quite evident that CIA personnel are not only unfairly judging you, but also have every intention of using you as a "stepping-stone" for their own designs.] (S) (X) Per [redacted] 1/89 CIA

b1 Per CIA

b3

b1 Per CIA

b3

(U)  
This information is being pointed out to you so that you may be completely aware of the situation. You should be particularly alert to prevent being used as any such "stepping-stone" for [redacted] or [redacted] CIA should develop its own contacts without depending upon the [redacted] relationships already established between the [redacted] and [redacted] Only that liaison necessary for the coordination of domestic and foreign matters is necessary and it should be most circumspect.] (S) (X) Per [redacted] 1/89 CIA

b1 Per CIA

b3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO

FILE NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_

Date: ~~May~~ 2, 1949

To:

(S)




EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1,5)  
DATE 01-06-2016 BY: F76M45K62

b1 Per CIA  
b3

From: Director, FBI

Subject: (S) Appointment of CIA Liaison Representative




b1 Per CIA  
b3

(S) Reference is made to your letter dated March 28, 1949, wherein  
you advise that [redacted] had received information  
indicating that the Central Intelligence Agency desire to place a representa-  
tive [redacted] You requested any comments the Bureau might be able to make  
relative to this matter.

As you know, the Bureau, of course, can make no objection to the  
establishment of such liaison. For your confidential information, information has  
been received at the Seat of Government reflecting that such a CIA liaison repre-

(S)




b1 Per CIA  
b3

For your further information, it has been ascertained confidentially  
that CIA is presently considering one Samuel Herman Horton, a former Bureau  
Agent and now an employee of the Office of Special Operations, CIA, for the position  
in question. Horton entered the Bureau as a Special Agent on January 15, 1940.  
He was assigned to the Richmond and Cincinnati Offices and was transferred to  
the Seat of Government on June 28, 1943. He resigned on December 17, 1944, to  
accept a position with the Office of Strategic Services. Nothing derogatory is  
known concerning his character or integrity, and a review of his personnel file  
reflects that he was an above average employee.

b1 Per CIA  
b3

(S) The Bureau has confidentially received information reflecting [redacted]



b3 Per CIA



~~SECRET~~

b1 Per CIA  
b3

(S) [redacted]  
This is being brought to you for your attention so that you may be completely aware of the situation. ~~Horton, of course, should be extended the usual courtesies, however~~ you should be particularly alert to prevent being used as a "stepping stone" for CIA or Horton. CIA should develop its own contacts without depending on the excellent relationships already established between the FBI and [redacted] Only that liaison necessary for the coordination of domestic and foreign matters is necessary. *it should be most circumspet-*

b1 Per CIA  
b3

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. FLETCHER *HBF*

DATE: May 2, 1949

FROM : V. P. KEAY *VPK*

b1 Per CIA

b3 *[initials]*SUBJECT: (S) ESTABLISHMENT OF CIA REPRESENTATIVE *[redacted]*

*[initials]*

Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. [redacted] b1 Per CIA  
Tele. [redacted]  
Miss Gandy

(S) Agent DeLoach has confidentially ascertained that the Central Intelligence Agency plans to place a representative in *[redacted]* within the next several weeks. This representative will reportedly be one Samuel Herman Horton, a former Bureau Agent who resigned in December 1944 to accept a position with the Office of Strategic Services.

(S) It has also been ascertained that William K. Harvey, also a former Bureau Agent and now an employee of CIA, has recommended that only a former Bureau Agent should be placed *[redacted]* so that the proper relationship could be initiated with FBI Liaison Officer *[redacted]*. Harvey has further stated to his associates that any former Bureau Agent now working for CIA can gain the confidence of *[redacted]* and thereby have an entree with the *[redacted]* and other excellent contacts established by *[redacted]* and the FBI throughout the years. Harvey has also reportedly stated that, due to "peculiar personality", he feels it necessary that Horton be assigned to the job in question so that *[redacted]* might be properly handled."

(S) It is quite apparent that CIA will attempt to use the Bureau's liaison representative *[redacted]* as a "stepping stone" for the establishment of their man *[redacted]*.

(S) The attached letter to Agent *[redacted]* explains the above circumstances and places him on his guard accordingly.

RECORDED

67-38835

b3 Per CIA

1. What is record of Horton while with us?

2. The attached letter is you - satisfactory. I don't like its aggressiveness. Please rewrite.

(1 Enc.)

Attachment

CDD:tlc

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1,6)  
DATE 01-06-2016 BY: F76MA5K62

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date: May 2, 1949

To:

b1 Per CIA  
b3

(S)

From: Director, FBI

Subject: Appointment of CIA Liaison Representative

(S)

b1 Per CIA  
b3

(S)

Reference is made to your letter dated March 28, 1949 wherein you advise that the

b1 Per CIA  
b3

you requested any comments the Bureau might be able to make relative to this matter.

b1 Per CIA  
b3

As you know, the Bureau of course can make no objection to the establishment of such liaison

For your further information, it has been ascertained confidentially that CIA is presently considering one Samuel Herman Horton, a former Bureau Agent and now an employee of the Office of Special Operations, CIA, for the position in question. Horton entered the Bureau as a Special Agent on January 15, 1940. He was assigned to the Richmond and Cincinnati Offices and was transferred to the Seat of Government on June 28, 1943. He resigned on December 17, 1944, to accept a position with the Office of Strategic Services. Nothing derogatory is known concerning his character or integrity, and a review of his personnel file reflects that he was an above average employee.


(S) The Bureau has confidentially received information reflecting that CIA is of the opinion that it will be absolutely necessary to send a former Bureau Agent to London to adequately gain not only your confidence but that officials of It has also been ascertained that the new CIA representative will be instructed to do his best to gain your friendship and thereby have an entree with present FBI sources.

b1 Per CIA  
b3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)



b1 Per CIA  
b3

(S)

This is being brought to you for your attention so that you may be completely aware of the situation. Horton, of course, should be extended the usual courtesies, however you should be particularly alert to prevent being used as a "stepping stone" for CIA or Horton. CIA should develop its own contacts without depending on the excellent relationships already established between the FBI and [redacted] Only that liaison necessary for the coordination of domestic and foreign matters is necessary.

b1 Per CIA  
b3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. H. B. FLETCHER

DATE: June 28, 1949

FROM : V. P. KEARNEY

SUBJECT: ~~PREJUDICE AGAINST FORMER FBI AGENTS ON PART OF CIA~~  
~~TRAINING SCHOOL~~

Mr. William Harvey and [redacted] both former FBI Agents presently employed by CIA, have confidentially advised SA DeLoach that the Office of Special Operations, CIA, is having considerable trouble obtaining the services of former FBI Agents, inasmuch as the CIA Training School is apparently taking steps to "bust" the prospective former Agents before they complete a period of CIA foreign training. Harvey and [redacted] mentioned the specific cases of former Bureau Agents [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] and Harvey were of the opinion that the old OSS group in the CIA Training School definitely are biased in grading the ability of former FBI employees. Harvey was of the opinion that [redacted] were both intelligent individuals of good experience. However, their marks in the CIA Training School had shown up considerably below standard. Harvey then pointed to the marks made by individuals coming to CIA from the State Department, OSS, and other agencies, who, although possessing lower qualities of personality and intelligence, seemingly breezed through the Training School.

[redacted] advised Agent DeLoach on June 16, 1949, that [redacted] had not been recommended for overseas duty because of his grades; however, the Office of Policy Coordination had considered him an excellent applicant, and [redacted] the opportunity of accepting his application for duty in this country with the CIA.

ACTION: It is suggested this memorandum be referred to the Administrative Division.

CDD:slm:skr

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED  
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)  
DATE: 5-8-91

not surprising. That is  
what they can expect  
from [redacted]

Classified by 275 wew/ag  
Declassify on: OADR  
8/1/88 87-0568  
per CIA let 8/1/89

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1,6)  
DATE 01-06-2016 BY: F76M45K62

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1983

FEB 18 1986

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET~~

1101

8-18-03 CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60290/008/160 9-16-03 13001415 ddr, 9-2-03  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25Y  
#981541 2 awarded  
all 5715 13001415 ddr, 9-2-03  
chrypids -  
AUC 60290/008/160 9-16-03 13001415 ddr, 9-2-03  
chrypids -  
#981541 2 awarded

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Mr. Nease  
b1 Per CIA  
b3

b1 Per CIA  
b3

b1 Per CIA  
b3

b1 Per CIA  
b3

OFFICE MEMORANDUM \* UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 2-12-50

FROM : J. P. MOHR

**SECRET**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: PREPARATION OF BRIEF ON  
EMIL JULIUS KLAUS FUCHS, was

DECLASSIFIED BY *83242 PWT/fer*  
ON *012-14-78*

Reference is made to Mr. Fletcher's memorandum to the Director dated February 9, 1950, concerning Fuchs in which he refers to a translation of a captured German document which contained the name of Fuchs' father and subject Klaus Fuchs. The Director asked when we got this document.

By letter dated June 15, 1945, Mr. Cimperman sent to the Bureau a roll of film containing the content of two books on the NKDV and the OGPU which had been obtained by the OSS and which had been furnished to Cimperman on a personal and confidential basis. The books contained lists of names of individuals of interest to German intelligence and had been presumably prepared in the spring of 1941 prior to the German invasion of Russia. The list pertained to members of the Russian intelligence, Russian officials, and a large number of Germans believed by the German intelligence to be in Russia and closely identified with German communist activity and considered to be traitors to the Reich. On Page 51 of this document (page 163 in translation in Bureau file 61-3499-154, Vol. 1.) appears the following notation:

Fuchs, Klaus, student of philosophy, Dec. 29, 1911, Russelsheim, RSHA IVA2, Gestapa Field Office, K141 (S-1) *per CIA Let 2-7-59*

The symbols, RSHA IVA2, apparently refer to German intelligence records and from analysis of the general document place Klaus Fuchs in the character of a former German communist of relatively important character. (S-1) *per CIA Let 2-7-59*

After printing, photographs of this material were sent on July 6, 1945, to the Philadelphia Office for translation. The Philadelphia Office returned the translated material in several installments, the latest transmission being dated March 27, 1946. The returned material, unindexed, was retained in the office of former Special Agent Supervisor William Harvey, who is now with CIA, until November 1947 when it was collected together by Harvey's successor, Supervisor E.T. Turner, who sent it to the Records Section for indexing and filing. Fuchs' name was cross indexed in the Records Section on February 20, 1948, which was the actual date of completing the whole indexing project on the captured German document which involved the indexing of over 5,000 names.

It is not felt that this was an unusual length of time for the completion of a project of this size which was one of many similar projects. You will recall that there was a vast volume of captured German material which was obtained by the Bureau. You will recall we had

JPM:dw Director's notation, "I don't think it should take from November to Feb. 20 to index 5,000 names. Also, what kind of Div. Inspection is made by Div. 1 to permit a supervisor to hold such material for such a long period."

**SECRET**

H.

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED  
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)  
DATE: 5-8-01

COPIES # 107100  
SERIAL # 17350  
DATE 3/11/86 INITIALS PWT

64-50885-59

(S-1) *per CIA Let 2-7-59*

APR 30 1950

FEB 10 1950

~~SECRET~~

a Special Agent assigned for a considerable period of time to reviewing material obtained from captured German documents.

~~SECRET~~  
I feel that the principal responsibility for the failure to more promptly have this material put in the Bureau's files was that of former Special Agent Supervisor William Harvey. I recommend that no further action be taken with respect to this matter other than to place a copy of this memorandum in the personnel file of former Special Agent Supervisor William Harvey.

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

copy:ahs

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:

DATE: March 2, 1950

TO : A. H. TELLION  
FROM : V. P. KAY  
SUBJECT: TRAINING OF [REDACTED]

FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1,6)  
DATE 01-06-2016 BY: F76M45K62

b1 Per CIA  
b3

Former Special Agent William K. Harvey advised Mr. DeLoach on February 23, 1950, that C.I.A. intended forwarding a formal request to the FBI regarding the establishment of [REDACTED]

Harvey stated his purpose in discussing this informally was to ascertain if the Bureau would be receptive to such an offer. He advised that if such proved to be true Admiral Hillkoetter would forward a formal letter to the Director setting out full details of this matter.

Harvey was advised that his request would be considered by the Bureau and that he would be given an answer accordingly.

ACTION

It is suggested this memorandum be forwarded to the Training and Inspection Division for consideration.

CDG:hb

ROUTED TO	267,100
APPROV	
CIVILIAN	
E.O.	12850
DATE	3/11/50
INITIALS	

9-16-63 [REDACTED] 9-2-63 [REDACTED]  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Classified by [REDACTED]  
Declassify on: OADR  
975 [REDACTED] 9/17/88  
87-0688  
275 [REDACTED] 8-11-89  
FEB 23 1950

~~SECRET~~



February 27, 1950

ADDENDUM:

~~SECRET~~

PX

I would recommend that we not supply this information to Harvey and that the Bureau merely advise Harvey that we contacted numerous insurance agents and advisors for the information which we used in establishing our fund. I suggest that he be advised that since different problems confront [CIA] than those confronting the Bureau, the Bureau suggests he contact appropriate insurance company representatives for the necessary background information to help them establish such an insurance fund.

D. M. Ladd

Mr. Tolson, "I agree."

T.

Mr. Hoover's notation, "Yes".

H.

~~SECRET~~

EX-108  
FEB 18 1950

66-4182-808  
RUCIA  
4/2-7-59

copy am

OFFICE MEMORANDUM \* UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. H. B. FLETCHER February 23, 1950

FROM : MR. V. P. KEAY

SUBJECT: AGENTS INSURANCE FUND

b3 Per CIA

Former SA William K. Harvey telephonically contacted the Liaison Section on February 17, 1950, and advised that personnel of the Office of Special Operations, CIA, were interested in obtaining information concerning the above captioned insurance fund. Harvey advised that he and former SA [ ] desired to start such a fund for the personnel of their agency. Rec CIA let  
2-7-50 (K)

Harvey seemed particularly interested in obtaining information concerning the amounts of funds maintained on hand in proportion to the number of agents interested in the fund. He also desired to ascertain what legal technicalities must be handled before such a fund can be initiated. U

Harvey was advised that his request would be brought to the attention of the Chief Clerk's Office and that if such information was available to outside agencies he would be given an answer accordingly. U

ACTION

It is suggested this memorandum be forwarded to the Chief Clerk's Office for the attention of Mr. Gunsser. U

CDD:mk

267100

FORWARDED	
BY	
DATE	12356
INITIALS	9/17/88

[3-16 CIA (K)]

DECLASSIFIED BY 275 W...  
ON 5-11-89  
Rec CIA let 21 7/89

Classified by 275 W...  
Declassify on: OADR  
9/17/88 187-0568

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

KERCO  
FEB 18 1986

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR  
 FROM : LT. D. M. LADD  
 SUBJECT: WILLIAM K. HARVEY  
 LIAISON RELATIONS

DATE: August 2, 1950

~~SECRET~~

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

[Pursuant to instructions, Mr. De Loach called upon Admiral Hillenkoetter at 10:00 AM this date and advised him that the FBI felt that former Special Agent William K. Harvey, now employed by CIA, was unfriendly and hostile towards the FBI and that we would prefer to have Liaison relations with another individual.] (S-1)(A) u Pu CIA net 2/1/89

[Admiral Hillenkoetter expressed surprise at these remarks and indicated that it was his own personal opinion that Harvey had always leaned over backwards to promote a spirit of cooperation between the FBI and CIA. Hillenkoetter advised that it was unfortunate that Harvey possessed a most ambitious and forceful personality which at times made letters written by Harvey quite pointed and sarcastic. He stated that on occasions he had found it necessary to "tone down" letters that Harvey had written to the Bureau. However, he felt that Harvey had never intentionally caused any dissension between the FBI and CIA and that he definitely regretted the Director's decision in that matter. He reiterated that Harvey's sarcasm was merely the result of a forceful and ambitious personality and definitely not intentional or planned maliciousness.] (S-1)(A) u Pu CIA net 2/1/89

[Admiral Hillenkoetter advised that he would appoint anyone suggested by the Bureau for Liaison dealings. He was in turn advised by De Loach that the Bureau could make no such suggestion and that it appeared to be his duty to make such an appointment. The Admiral also indicated that if you wished to take any administrative action against Harvey, he would be glad to do so. However, he said that he certainly hoped this matter could be worked out to the satisfaction of the Bureau. He added that Harvey would probably desire to visit the Bureau and make apologies or else ascertain the cause of this action. He was advised that we would have no objections to Harvey's visiting the Bureau but that unless you decreed otherwise, Liaison relations would have to be conducted with other individuals within CIA.] (S-1)(A) u Pu CIA net 2/1/89

ACTION

CDD:r-lk

~~SECRET~~

FEB 18 1986

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 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Classified by SP-3/1/89  
 Declassify on: OADR 2/1/89

FOI/PA # 267/10  
 APPEAL #  
 CIVIL ACT. #  
 E.O. # 12356  
 DATE 4/1/86 INITIALS pld  
 [S-1] is CIA net 2/1/89

APR 30 1989

copy am

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1)  
DATE 01-06-2016 BY: F76M45K62

OFFICE MEMORANDUM \* UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: July 5, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COOPERATION WITH CIA

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED  
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)  
DATE: 5-8-91

~~SECRET~~

PURPOSE

WM K. HARVEY

To advise you of the steps which have been taken pursuant to the Director's instructions, to prevent this Bureau from being charged by CIA with failure or delay in furnishing information of interest to that agency.

BACKGROUND:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1 Per CIA  
b3

You will recall that, as a result of a letter dated June 14, 1950, from the Director, CIA alleging lack of cooperation on the part of a Bureau representative in [redacted] and implying that other instances have occurred wherein the Bureau's [redacted] have failed to freely exchange with CIA Offices matters of mutual interest, the Director wrote, "I consider this a very serious development we cannot afford to be jockeyed by CIA into any position where failure or delay in furnishing information on our part can be charged. Get to bottom of it at once. See that every precaution is taken to avoid such a situation." H.

ACTION TAKEN:

CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60290/DC/AG/68  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X [redacted]

SEE REVERSE  
SIDE FOR  
CLASSIFICATION  
ACTION

b1 Per CIA  
b3

As you will recall, on June 27, 1950, Admiral Hillenkoetter was advised that a review of the records of this Bureau reflected that on January 17, 1950, a Liaison representative of the FBI Personally delivered to CIA a letter furnishing all salient information [redacted]

This same letter pointed out to Admiral Hillenkoetter that the Bureau's communication of January 16, 1950, had apparently been overlooked at the time his letter of June 14, 1950, to the Bureau was prepared.

In the Bureau's letter of June 27, 1950, Admiral Hillenkoetter was advised that a review of Bureau records has failed to reflect any instance in which the Bureau has not furnished information of interest to CIA and a request was made that, if any specific cases of alleged lack of cooperation are known to CIA, the Bureau would appreciate being furnished with the complete data concerning each such alleged instance.

This matter is being followed very closely through Liaison with Admiral Hillenkoetter in an effort to expedite CIA's reply to Bureau letter dated June 27 1950.

As you will recall also, a letter has been addressed [redacted]

b1 Per CIA  
b3

Director immediately by cablegram with a summary of his [redacted] concerning this matter.

CAM:smk

Director's notation, "Yes, press for this. CIA out to put up or shut up."

~~SECRET~~

H

~~SECRET~~

(U) ~~X~~ On July 5, 1950, a letter was sent to all Bureau representatives stationed at posts outside the United States reiterating and emphasizing standing instructions that they furnish to CIA representatives in their country of assignment all information which should be logically brought to the attention of CIA. ~~X~~ ~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information. This matter is being followed closely and you will be advised immediately of all developments.

~~SECRET~~

~~DATE:~~ June 22, 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

W. M. K. HARVEY

~~DECLASSIFIED~~  
#98154

~~b3~~  
~~NY ON: 25X~~  
~~b1~~ Per CIA  
~~b3~~

Declassify on: OADR

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b1 Per CIA  
b3

—

(u)  
 CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED  
 BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)  
 DATE: 5-8-91  
~~SECRET~~ HEROX  
 FEB 18 1986

~~SECRET~~

There is attached also for your approval a letter to Admiral Hillenkoetter advising him that the Bureau files reflect that information was furnished to him on January 17, 1950, concerning the matter in question. This letter also requests that the Bureau be informed of any instances where information was not furnished to CIA inasmuch as Bureau files fail ~~to reflect~~ ~~any~~ such derelictions.

Director's notation, " I consider this a very serious development. We cannot afford to be jockeyed by CIA into any position where failure or delay in furnishing information on our part can be charged. Get to bottom of it at once. See that every precaution is taken to avoid such a situation."

H.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: WILLIAM K. HARVEY  
FORMER SPECIAL AGENT  
LIAISON RELATIONS

DATE: August 3, 1950

**SECRET**

8/7/88  
Classified by 275 ufw/og  
Declassify on: OADR  
87-0568

Tolson ✓  
Ladd ✓  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Nichols  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Harbo  
Tele. Room  
Nease  
Gandy

Mr. Harvey called at my office on August 3. [He stated that Admiral Hillenkoetter had informed him of the Bureau's displeasure at his attitude toward the Bureau] and that he desired to call and rectify what he feels sure is an honest mistake.

I pointed out to him the reason for the Bureau's displeasure, namely the very critical letter of June 14, 1950, which indicated a lack of cooperation on the part of the FBI with CIA when in fact the facts in that letter were all incorrect. I pointed out to him further, that the Bureau had indications of instances where he had endeavored to "needle" the Bureau from time to time and that these things indicated a hostility on his part towards the Bureau, in view of which the Bureau had no alternative but to suggest that liaison between the Bureau and CIA be through someone else. (S-1)(X)u

Mr. Harvey stated in the first place he did not write this letter, that it was true that he had initialed it as he did all other outgoing mail at CIA. He stated obviously from the facts in this case that CIA was wrong in writing this letter; that he obviously was guilty in not being careful when he initialed this letter. He stated, however, in mitigation of this that he would like to state that he had stopped other letters at CIA which were somewhat critical and he would continue to do so in the future and to permit closer relations between the two agencies; that he feels no hostility toward the Bureau; that in fact he has the highest regard for the Bureau and that he would go out of his way to see that information of interest is sent to the Bureau. He further stated that he would like to see the Director some time and express his regrets in this regard. I advised him you were out of the city at the present time. (S-1)(X)u

After advising the Director of my conference with Mr. Harvey, the Director indicated that the liaison arrangements with Mr. Harvey could continue for the present to determine whether his attitude was as he has indicated.

DML:dad

267,100  
17366  
4-7-86 INITIALS MLE

7 AUG 9 1950

XEROX  
FEB 18 1986RECORDS SECTION  
MAY 26 1983**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED BY... 275 ufw/og  
ON... 8-7-88  
PER CIA/EX-2789

ERNMENT

## Office Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

DATE: July 10, 1950

TO : Mr. Belmont  
FROM : V. P. Keay  
SUBJECT: COOPERATION WITH CIA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Tolson  
Ladd  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Tele. Room  
Nease  
Gandy

Reference is made to the Director's instructions that CIA should be advised of information received from [redacted] which entirely refuted the claims made in CIA letter to the Bureau dated June 14th, 1950, alleging lack of cooperation. You will recall [redacted] advised by cablegram dated July 7th, 1950, that CIA had been given the information in question during the first week in January, 1950. (S) (X) Per CIA let (u) 2-7-89

Mr. DeLoach called upon Admiral Hillenkoetter this morning at 11:00 a.m. It was pointedly brought to the Admiral's attention at this time that not only had FBI headquarters furnished this information to CIA headquarters in January 1950, but that an inquiry in [redacted] had been notified during the first week of January, 1950. b1 Per CIA b3

Admiral Hillenkoetter was advised that apparently his representatives, both at headquarters and at the field, had overlooked the FBI information, and that most certainly the FBI was not to blame for CIA's failure in this regard. (S) (X) Per CIA let (u) 2-7-89

The last paragraph of Bureau letter to Admiral Hillenkoetter dated June 27, 1950, which requested that CIA back-up their statement concerning other instances in which [redacted] have failed to exchange information, was mentioned once again. He was advised that no answer had been received from him proving this statement and that very definitely some explanation should be given or else it would be understood that CIA had no facts to prove their charges of alleged lack of cooperation. b1 Per CIA b3

Admiral Hillenkoetter replied that he sincerely regretted allowing the initial letter in this instance to go out of his agency. [He stated that former SA William K. Harvey prepared the letter in question and it was now evident to him that Harvey had no proof or background upon which to base his charges. He stated that apparently Harvey was grasping at straws in order to bring charges against the FBI.] He continued that he (Admiral Hillenkoetter) had been extremely busy on the day the CIA letter had been sent to the FBI and that he had signed this communication without reading it. He additionally advised that he knew of no instances where the FBI had failed to cooperate with CIA representatives, both in Washington, D. C. and in the foreign fields. He also stated that he intended to censure both Harvey [redacted] because of their participation in this matter. (S) (X) Per CIA let (u) 2-7-89

Attachment

CDD:lac

FOI/PA # 267,100  
APPEAL #  
CIVIL ACT. #  
E.O. # 12356  
DATE 3/11/86 INITIALS  
(S) is CIA (X)

Classified by [redacted]  
Declassify on: OADR 30 1986

~~SECRET~~

RECORDS SECTION  
FEB 18 1988

CLASSIFIED  
BY DEPT. OF  
JULY 10 1950  
EXEMPTIONS FURNISHED  
BY DEPT. OF  
JULY 10 1950  
(DRC)

~~SECRET~~

Mr. DeLoach advised Admiral Hillenkoetter that we had no interest in his employees being censured, however, the FBI would appreciate factual statements, of some background, before "trumped-up" charges were hurled erroneously. The Admiral requested that Mr. Hoover be advised that he would appreciate this matter being dropped. Furthermore, that in the future he would carefully examine all mail coming over his desk addressed to the FBI which was initiated by former SA Harvey.

~~IS (W) per CIA letter 2/7/89~~

ACTION:

Regardless of Admiral Hillenkoetter's assurances that he regrets this matter, it is believed desirable that the attached letter refuting CIA's claims should be forwarded to CIA for purposes of making this incident a matter of record.

2. Laguer, ← JH

Place a copy in  
personnel file of  
former agent  
Harvey

← yes by all  
means. H.

~~SECRET~~

8-18-03

July 11, 1950

AUC 60240 pce/dag/ld

CONFIDENTIAL  
VIA AIR MAIL

# 981541 62 awarded - 9-16-03 442008 Lt. Col. 9-2-03  
OR 275 Recd 172 perin. (S)  
Dear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Administration Building, Room 123  
2430 E Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS WITHIN  
BY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DDO)  
5-8-91

Dear Admiral Hillenkoetter:

(S) Reference is made to my letter to you dated June 27, 1950, in answer to your letter of June 14, 1950, your file [redacted] (S) I will recall that your letter referred specifically to the [redacted] of this Bureau exchanging information with your representatives in the foreign field, particular [redacted] (S)

b1 Per CIA  
b3

(S) I have caused an inquiry to be made at the Legal Attache's Office [redacted] regarding the incident mentioned in your referenced letter. I have now been advised that Special Agent [redacted] in January 1950, notified [redacted] (S)

b1 Per CIA

[redacted] full details surrounding [redacted] which have been the subject of debate between our agency and the FBI. According to the FBI representative, [redacted] appeared incredulous about this particular information and expressed [redacted] Bureau representative at that time. It appears that either [redacted] has forgotten what [redacted] told, or else the information was not forwarded to CIA Headquarters. (S) 115

I wish to reiterate the facts expressed in my letter of June 27, 1950, noting that a review of the records of this Bureau does not reflect any instances of lack of cooperation on the part of the FBI, and that if any specific cases are known to you, I would appreciate your furnishing the complete data to me.

With assurance of my highest regards,

Sincerely yours,

CDD:lac

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

FOI/PA#	207/100
APPROVAL	
CIVILACT.	
I.O.	17560
DATE	3/11/50
INITIALS	(S) [redacted]

Classified by 621-614/104  
Declassify on: OADR 3/11/86  
275 [redacted] 8/7/88  
87-8568

LEAKED  
FEB 18 1986

June 23, 1950

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~VIA LIAISON~~

~~SECRET~~

67-168897-1  
Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Administration Building, Room, 123  
2430 E Street, NW  
Washington, D.C.

8-18-03  
CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60290/AC/1/8/85  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X  
#981541 as needed  
10-6-03 Per OGA Let dtd 9-2-03

Dear Admiral Hillenkoetter:

WM. K. HARVEY [I]'s pass 182  
was classified

(S) 1230 (S) Reference is made to your memorandum dated June 14, 1950, your file  
[redacted] wherein you state in part: "Probably through inadvertence, it  
(S) seems that a reciprocal exchange (of information on matters of mutual interest)  
(S) has not always been made by the [redacted] This has occurred, particularly,  
[redacted]." (S) Per CIA Let 2/7/89

62-80750  
A review of the records of this Bureau reflects that on January 17, 1950  
a liaison representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation personally  
delivered to the Central Intelligence Agency a letter addressed to you and marked  
for the attention of [redacted] This particular letter set forth under  
the caption, [redacted]

(U) [redacted] It appears that this letter  
may have been overlooked prior to the preparation of your memorandum of June 14,  
1950. (S) Per CIA Let 2/7/89

Your memorandum also implied that there are possibly other cases in  
which this Bureau has not furnished information of interest to the Central In-  
telligence Agency. A review of the records of this Bureau does not reflect any  
instances of this and if any specific cases are known to you. I would appreciate  
your furnishing the complete data to me.

With assurance of my highest regards,

Sincerely yours,

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~  
CLASSIFIED PROVISIONS FINALIZED  
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRG)  
DATE: 5-8-91

CAH:raw;objmls; lke

Classified by SP6 Byn/ndy  
Declassify on: OADR 3/11/86  
275W/1/87  
87-056  
275W/1/87 5-11-89

FOI/PA # 267,100  
APPEAL # 12356  
CIVIL ACT. # 12356  
E.O. # 12356  
DATE 3/11/86 INITIALS ndy  
(S) is CIA (S)

~~SECRET~~

FEB 18 1986



~~induced~~ ~~SECRET~~ UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: ISRAEL HALPERIN  
ESPIONAGE - R  
Bufile 65-59104

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

DATE: August 18, 1951

Tolson  
Ladd  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Nichols  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Harbo  
Belmont  
Mohr  
Tele. Room  
Nease  
Gandy

Classified by *SP-6 B. J. [illegible]*  
Declassify on: OADR 3/11/86

PURPOSE

To set forth a brief synopsis of action taken concerning individuals listed in the notebooks of Israel Halperin. *U*

BACKGROUND

Documents abstracted from the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa, Canada, by Igor Gouzenko, Soviet Code Clerk who defected on September 5, 1945, supported by the testimony of Gouzenko himself, established that Israel Halperin, a Canadian citizen, was a member of the Soviet Military Intelligence espionage network operating in Canada during the period 1942-1945. Apprehended in February, 1946 Halperin subsequently was placed on trial for conspiracy to violate the Canadian Official Secrets Act. However, on March 4, 1947, charges against him were dismissed upon refusal of a co-conspirator to testify against him and the consequent failure on the part of the Crown attorneys to link him with the conspiracy through independent evidence, a condition precedent to the admissibility of the Soviet documents. On March 12, 1946, the Bureau liaison representative in Ottawa, Canada, forwarded photostatic copies of an address book and a small appointment book, both of which were handwritten, found in Halperin's possession at the time of his apprehension. Together they contain more than 700 names, many of which are mere notations reflecting incomplete and illegible data. Many names are misspelled, or incomplete, frequently reference being made to individuals only by a common given name and very often the address consists only of a street number or is entirely missing. There is frequent duplication and instances have appeared where although a foreign address is given, the individual is known to have been in this country. *U*

ACTION TAKEN

On June 11, 1946, photostatic copies of the two Halperin documents were sent to 19 offices covering territories in which listed addresses in the U.S. were located. Offices receiving copies of this letter of June 11, 1946, were instructed to immediately

EMG:TD

11 OCT 25 1951

~~SECRET~~

FEB 18 1986

1983

8-18-03 CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60460 BAE/BJG/BJG  
DECLASSIFY ON: 60460 BAE/BJG/BJG

DATE 5-8-91  
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)

*Place copies in file of [illegible]*

~~SECRET~~

"Identify all the contacts of Halperin listed in the inclosures." Bureau memorandum of June 11, 1946, instructed the SACs of the respective offices to personally see that appropriate initial reports were submitted to the Bureau as soon as possible. Thereafter, reports were submitted in the Corby case and in individual cases on persons whose names appeared in the Halperin documents. These cases were supervised and followed individually. The Halperin notebooks had been made available to the British Security Authorities and no investigation was conducted by the Bureau regarding persons not listed as residing in the U. S. inasmuch as both the Canadian and British authorities were conducting investigations in connection with the ramifications of the Canadian espionage network and pertinent information being developed by the respective services was being exchanged. As of that time, the Domestic Intelligence Division was seriously derelict in two respects: (1) failure to make a complete search of Bureau files on all the names of individuals appearing in the Halperin notebooks (2) failure to make inquiry concerning those individuals not indicated as residing in this country. This matter was then being handled under the supervision of former Special Agent William K. Harvey who is no longer a Bureau employee. ~~He is a person who is not to be trusted.~~ [Now A G I G shot at C I. A.]

Among the entries in the Halperin notebooks appeared the name of Klaus Fuchs, Assistant to M. Born, 84 George Lane, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, Camp N (Camp L) Internment Operations. Following the arrest of Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs by British authorities on February 2, 1950, action taken concerning individuals listed in the Halperin notebooks was reconsidered, further reviews made and investigation conducted. (S) U

When informed by memorandum dated May 15, 1950, as to what action had been taken and the fact that the Correlation Unit was currently engaged on a project for the further breakdown, interpretation and reanalysis of the Halperin documents, you noted, in part, "This should be expedited. It is significant that 4 years elapsed before we made this move. This does not reflect favorably upon the Security Division." (NOTE: Memorandum of May 15, 1950, and a supplemental memorandum of May 17, 1950, are attached hereto.) (S) U

[By memorandum dated January 15, 1951, it was noted that the Halperin notebooks contained 644 names of individuals cap- (S) U

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

able of being searched through Bureau indices which search had been completed. It was pointed out that 20 of the individuals listed in the Halperin notebooks were or had been subjects of espionage investigations in the Bureau. 86 cases were opened in the Espionage Unit to conduct additional investigation or to identify persons living abroad. Summaries of information or Correlation memoranda concerning 153 persons were referred to the Internal Security Unit since Bureau files contained no information that they were engaged in espionage activities but did contain information reflecting Communist activities. There they were reviewed and analyzed. If the facts warranted and not already done, the various Divisional offices were instructed to conduct the necessary investigation. [REDACTED]

b3  
b7D

[REDACTED] No further action was taken concerning 26 persons where it was determined an investigation previously had been conducted and no Communist activity found and where in several instances the persons were deceased. The remaining names in the address book consisted of business firms and minor children of no apparent espionage significance, illegible or incomplete names which appeared impracticable to attempt identification, duplications and names of spouses of persons concerning whom investigation had been or was being conducted. (S)U

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~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] It was noted that should information concerning any particular person be necessary at any future time, inquiry concerning such individuals, of course, would be made. To this you noted your approval. (X)

ACTION

The above is submitted for your information.

✓

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

December 20, 1951

RE: WILLIAM KING ~~X~~ HARVEY

Since Harvey's resignation from the FBI, effective August 27, 1947, we have been dealing with him on a limited basis in liaison matters at the Central Intelligence Agency. In 1949, Harvey became Chief of liaison matters for CIA, therefore all policy and guidance of CIA liaison came under his jurisdiction.

Harvey's personnel file reflects that he entered on duty with the FBI on December 9, 1940. He was assigned to the Bureau as a Supervisor in March of 1942 and assumed duties in the Internal Security Division. His personnel file reflects that he was considered an excellent Bureau representative who possessed a keen analytical mind. He appeared to be especially adapted to intelligence work involving German espionage. In 1947, his wife telephonically advised the Bureau that he was missing; that he had been despondent and discouraged about his work at the Bureau and that he had been moody. Inquiries established that he attended a Sectional party for a Bureau representative and that upon returning home his car stalled in the rain. While waiting for someone to come along and push him he reportedly fell asleep. Mr. Tamm recommended that no administrative action be taken against him since it did not appear that he was intoxicated but merely fell asleep and slept until 10:00 O'clock the following morning. Upon being questioned, Harvey indicated that he was not frustrated about his work but that he did periodically become discouraged about the ineffectiveness of the Government in dealing with Communists. On July 23, 1947, he was transferred to Indianapolis. However, shortly thereafter he submitted his resignation because of what he termed personal and family considerations.

By memorandum dated March 21, 1949, Mr. Glavin advised that the records of the Bureau indicated that former Agent Harvey and several other Agents were assigned reports in the Smedley

CWB:mfs

ENCLOSURE

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case for the period from February 6, 1947 to October 16, 1947. Harvey was acting number one man of the Espionage Section during that time. He was responsible for the unassignment of the Smedley case from the standpoint of supervision for a considerable period of time. He failed to cause file reviews to be made, summaries to be written, and to have basic investigative steps taken in the Smedley case. Mr. Glavin remarked that former Agent Harvey bears the brunt of the responsibility for the haphazard assignment of the Smedley Case.

b1 Per CIA

(S) In May of 1949, Harvey, acting as an official of CIA, <sup>b3</sup> stated to several CIA associates that he thought a former Bureau Agent should be placed by CIA as that agency's liaison representative [redacted] Harvey indicated that this should be done so that [redacted] of the FBI could be properly handled." He, of course, confidentially ascertained the above information and instructed our representative to be on guard against being used as a "stepping stone" by CIA.

By memorandum dated February 13, 1950, Mr. J. P. Mohr made reference to a captured German document which contained the name of Klaus Fuchs and his father. This material had been sent to Philadelphia for translation and upon being returned to the Seat of Government remained unindexed in the office of former Agent Harvey between March 27, 1946 and November of 1947. It was felt that the principal responsibility for the failure to have this material put in Bureau files was that of former Agent Harvey.

(S) You will recall that in June of 1950, CIA made a com-plaint to the Bureau reflecting there had not been a reciprocal <sup>b1 Per CIA</sup> exchange of information between the FBI and CIA <sup>b3</sup> [redacted] CIA stated that the Bureau had delayed several [redacted] into them information [redacted]

(S) [redacted] by letter dated June 20, 1950, we [redacted] complaint was without basis and that in fact we had furnished them information in this matter on January 17, 1950, and additionally had furnished them such information verbally [redacted] Director of CIA Admiral <sup>b1 Per CIA</sup> Hillenkoetter confidentially advised an FBI liaison representative. <sup>b3</sup>

that former Agent Harvey was responsible for approving the letter in question. Admiral Hillenkoetter indicated he intended to censure Harvey because of this matter. Upon the Director's instructions, we advised Admiral Hillenkoetter at this time that we felt Harvey was hostile and unfriendly toward the Bureau and that we no longer intended to deal with him.

On August 9, 1950, Harvey called upon Mr. Ladd and attempted to explain his actions in the above matter. He pointed out that he had initialled the letter in question but that he did not write it and he failed to read it. He stated he felt no hostility toward the Bureau. Upon being advised of Harvey's call, the Director indicated that liaison arrangements could be continued with Harvey insofar as his attitude continued as indicated in his interview with Mr. Ladd.

By memorandum dated August 18, 1951, Mr. Ladd advised that in connection with the case entitled "Israel Halperin, Espionage - R," the Domestic Intelligence Division was seriously derelict in two respects:

- (1) Failure to make a complete search of Bureau files on all the names of individuals appearing in the Halperin notebooks
- (2) Failure to make inquiry concerning these individuals not indicated as residing in this country.

It was pointed out that this matter was supervised by former Agent Harvey while in the employment of the Bureau.

~~SECRET~~

*indum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: November 27, 1951

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: FORMER FBI AGENTS [REDACTED]

b3 Per CIA

Pursuant to your instructions, there is detailed below a brief regarding former FBI Agents whom we deal with at the present time, and whom we will deal with in the future.

[REDACTED] A brief of each former Agent's personnel file is attached to this memorandum. However, a short narrative is presented in this memorandum covering the pertinent parts of each individual brief.

(1) [REDACTED]

b3 Per CIA

We have no current information concerning [REDACTED] in the files which would reflect his feelings toward the Bureau. It is understood that he is presently on assignment [REDACTED]

b3 Per CIA

(S) [REDACTED] entered on duty as a Special Agent on January 6, 1941. After a tour of duty in several offices he reported to the SIS Section of the Bureau on November 2, 1944. He resigned, effective November 15, 1946, in order to accept employment with an unidentified oil company as Manager of Public Relations. [REDACTED] file reflects that Legal Attache John Spengler called [REDACTED]

b1 Per CIA

b3

b1 Per CIA

b3

b1 Per CIA

b3

Attachment  
CDD:mfs:lm

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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~~SECRET~~

On July 15, 1944, he called at the Bureau requesting to see you. However, he was advised that you were out of town. On May 22, 1946, he again called at the Bureau and requested to see you. Upon being advised that you were busy with a United States Attorneys conference, he indicated that he would not see anyone else.

b1 Per CIA  
b3

(S)

(2)

b3 Per CIA

[redacted] personnel file reveals that he entered on duty with the FBI on December 2, 1935. He resigned effective March 24, 1945. He was formerly chief of the Espionage Section and his efficiency reports average from Very Good to Excellent. [redacted] submitted his resignation on March 21, 1945, in order to accept a position as Deputy Director of the War Foods Administration. In connection with his resignation, Mr. Tolson talked to him and advised him that it was contrary to our policy to grant releases; however, the Bureau would interpose no objection to his resigning. By memorandum dated March 27, 1945, Mr. J. P. Mohr advised that the Investigative Unit of the Department of Agriculture had requested the service record of [redacted] since that Department desired him to enter on duty as of March 26, 1945. Mr. Mohr pointed out that [redacted] transfer was effected through the Civil Service Commission despite the fact the FBI would not furnish him a release. It is noted that on April 13, 1945, the Civil Service Commission advised the Bureau that [redacted] transfer to the Department of Agriculture had been authorized without reemployment rights. Upon [redacted] departure, I pointed out that I had noticed a tendency on the part of [redacted] to delegate more and more responsibility and that [redacted] did not have his finger as closely on the operations of the Espionage Section as he should have had.

b3 Per CIA

On February 20, 1946, the Bureau indicated to former SAC Spencer Drayton that [redacted] could not be recommended

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~~SECRET~~

favorably. The Strategic Services Unit, successor to the Office of Strategic Services, was advised of the same thing on October 7, 1946.

(3) WILLIAM KING HARVEY

Since Harvey's resignation from the FBI, effective August 27, 1947, we have been dealing with him on a limited basis in liaison matters at CIA. In 1949, Harvey became Chief of liaison matters for CIA, therefore all policy and guidance of CIA liaison came under his jurisdiction.

Harvey's personnel file reflects that he entered on duty with the FBI on December 9, 1940. He was assigned to the Bureau as a Supervisor in March of 1942 and assumed duties in the Internal Security Division. His personnel file reflects that he was considered an excellent Bureau representative who possessed a keen analytical mind. He appeared to be especially adapted to intelligence work involving German espionage. In 1947, his wife telephonically advised the Bureau that he was missing; that he had been despondent and discouraged about his work at the Bureau and that he had been moody. Inquiries established that he attended a Sectional party for a Bureau representative and that upon returning home his car stalled in the rain. While waiting for someone to come along and push him he reportedly fell asleep. Mr. Tamm recommended that no administrative action be taken against him since it did not appear that he was intoxicated but merely fell asleep and slept until 10:00 o'clock the following morning. Upon being questioned, Harvey indicated that he was not frustrated about his work but that he did periodically become discouraged about the ineffectiveness of the Government in dealing with Communists. On July 23, 1947, he was transferred to Indianapolis. However, shortly thereafter he submitted his resignation because of what he termed personal and family considerations.

By memorandum dated March 21, 1949, Mr. Glavin advised that the records of the Bureau indicated that former Agent Harvey and several other Agents were assigned reports in the Smedley case for the period from February 6, 1947 to October 16, 1947. Harvey was acting number one man of the Espionage Section during that time. He was responsible for the unassignment of the Smedley case from the standpoint of supervision for a considerable period of time. He failed to cause file reviews to be made, summaries to be written, and to have basic investigative steps taken in the Smedley case. Mr. Glavin remarked that former Agent Harvey bears the brunt of the responsibility for the haphazard assignment of the Smedley Case.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

(S) In May of 1949, Harvey, acting as an official of CIA,  
(S) stated to several CIA associates that he thought a former  
Bureau Agent should be placed b [redacted] b1 Per CIA

[redacted] Harvey indicated that this should be b3  
done so that [redacted] of the FBI could be properly handled."  
We, of course, confidentially ascertained the above information  
and instructed our representative to be on guard against being  
used as a "stepping stone" by CIA.

By memorandum dated February 12, 1950, Mr. J. P. Mohr  
made reference to a captured German document which contained  
the name of Klaus Fuchs and his father. This material had been  
sent to Philadelphia for translation and upon being returned to  
the Seat of Government remained unindexed in the office of former  
Agent Harvey between March 27, 1946 and November of 1947. It  
was felt that the principal responsibility for the failure to  
have this material put in Bureau files was that of former Agent  
Harvey.

b1 Per CIA

(S) You will recall that in June of 1950, CIA made a com- b3  
plaint to the Bureau reflecting there had not been a reciprocal  
exchange of information between the FBI and CIA [redacted]  
(S) CIA stated that the Bureau had delayed several [redacted]  
[redacted] nishing them information [redacted]

(S) [redacted] By  
letter dated June 28, 1950, we pointed out to CIA that their  
complaint was without basis and that in fact we had furnished  
them information in this matter on January 17, 1950, and  
[redacted] additionally had furnished them such information verbally in b1 Per CIA  
b3

[redacted] Director of CIA Admiral Hillenkoetter confidentially  
advised an FBI liaison representative that former Agent Harvey  
was responsible for approving the letter in question. Admiral  
Hillenkoetter indicated he intended to censure Harvey because of  
this matter. Upon your instructions, we advised Admiral  
Hillenkoetter at this time that we felt Harvey was hostile and  
unfriendly toward the Bureau and that we no longer intended to  
deal with him.

On August 3, 1950, Harvey called upon me and attempted  
to explain his actions in the above matter. He pointed out that  
he had initialled the letter in question but that he did not

~~SECRET~~

write it and he failed to read it. He stated he felt no hostility toward the Bureau. I advised you of Harvey's call and you indicated at this time that liaison arrangements could be continued with Harvey insofar as his attitude continued as indicated in his interview with me.

By memorandum dated August 18, 1951, I advised that in connection with the case entitled "Israel Halperin, Espionage - R" the Domestic Intelligence Division was seriously derelict in two respects:

- (1) Failure to make a complete search of Bureau files on all the names of individuals appearing in the Halperin notebooks
- (2) Failure to make inquiry concerning those individuals not indicated as residing in this country.

It was pointed out that this matter was supervised by former Agent Harvey while in the employment of the Bureau. You noted, "Be sure Harvey's personnel file reflects this."

(4) [redacted]

b3 Per CIA

[redacted] entered on duty with the FBI on December 3, 1936 as a Clerk-Typist. He became an Agent effective July 15, 1940. He served in the Los Angeles and Seattle Offices and on June 14, 1942, was transferred to Buenos Aires on SIS duty. He was reassigned to the domestic field on July 29, 1946. [redacted] resigned effective October 3, 1946, indicating he desired to enter business for himself.

b1 Per CIA  
b3

(5) [redacted]

No derogatory information is known concerning [redacted]

(5)

[redacted] entered on duty with the FBI on March 18, 1946. He served in the Chicago and Washington Field Offices and resigned effective September 15, 1948, indicating he planned to enter on active duty with the United States Army. [redacted]

[redacted] However, on March 28, 1949, he called upon Mr. Mohr and desired to ascertain his chances of being reinstated as a Special Agent of the FBI. He was advised that we were making no reinstatements for the remainder of the fiscal year.

We have been dealing with [redacted] since the early part of 1950 in [redacted] He has at all times exhibited a rather friendly attitude and no derogatory information is known concerning him. [redacted] is believed to be the type of person who is restless and will not remain happy in any one job for any given length of time. [redacted]

(6)

[redacted] entered on duty with the FBI as of August 1, 1939. He served in the Newark and Cincinnati Offices and reported at the Seat of Government in the latter part of 1941 as a Supervisor. He resigned effective January 15, 1945.

You will recall that this former Agent in January of 1945 was instructed to telephonically contact certain field offices for the purpose of issuing instructions as to what action should be undertaken by Bureau Agents in connection with the War Department seizure of certain facilities of Montgomery Ward and Company. Specifically, he was to inform these offices that in the event the Army notified a certain official he was discharged and ordered him to leave the plant and the official refused to leave, the Bureau Agent present should point out that disobedience might constitute a violation of the Smith-Connally Act. In relaying these instructions to the field offices, Agent [redacted] did not specifically point out or draw to the attention of the field offices the fact that Bureau Agents should point out a possible violation of the Smith-Connally Act only after there had been some showing on the part of the company official that he intended to resist the Army order. [redacted] was censured because of his action in this matter.

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In a memorandum dated January 15, 1945, I pointed out that I had questioned [redacted] concerning his prior knowledge and other employees' knowledge of the fact that the Chief Clerk's Office had drawn up papers requesting [redacted] resignation from the FBI. [redacted] indicated that he would not disclose his source inasmuch as information had been given him in extreme confidence. You will recall that this information was additionally known outside the Bureau by former Special Agent Frank Stone. The personnel files of both [redacted] and Stone fail to reveal that [redacted] resignation had actually been requested.

b3 Per CIA

(S)

b1 Per CIA  
b3

(S)

(S)

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~~SECRET~~

(7) [redacted]

b3 Per CIA

[redacted] entered on duty with the FBI on December 2, 1940. He was requested to submit his resignation effective March 4, 1943, without prejudice, in view of his failure to develop as a Special Agent.

You will recall that we had considerable difficulty with [redacted] in view of several factors; namely, while in SIS in Bogota, Colombia he did not get along with Agents Spears and Godfrey, who were attached to the American Embassy in Bogota. It was apparent that [redacted] was engaged in gossip with Embassy personnel. b3 Per CIA

In September of 1942, I pointed out that [redacted] had a deplorable attitude and his loyalty was doubtful. [redacted] was returned to the domestic field, censured by letter, and placed on probation, reduced in salary to Grade CAF-9, and transferred to the Sioux Falls Office. The SAC of Sioux Falls soon afterwards stated [redacted] could not be considered an asset as far as being an investigator was concerned although it was believed that he would develop. This SAC, in January of 1943, reported that [redacted] was not cut out to be a Special Agent. In February of 1943, Mr. Coffey advised that [redacted] could not be used in the FBI Laboratory since he had been the source of difficulty when he was engaged in technical radio work while in SIS. On March 4, 1943, as mentioned above, [redacted] was requested to submit his resignation. b3 Per CIA b1 Per CIA b3

(8) [redacted]

b3 Per CIA

[redacted] entered on duty with the FBI on April 1, 1941. He resigned effective January 24, 1947. He was on SIS duty between October of 1943 and March of 1945, having served in Ecuador. [redacted]

You will recall that Legal Attache Speakes, in May of 1947, advised the Seat of Government of the very unsatisfactory

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~~SECRET~~

condition of the Legal Attache's Office at Quito, Ecuador. Former Agent [ ] was in charge of the Quito Office before his recall to the domestic field. Speakes pointed out that the office safe had been loaned by [ ] to the wife of the United States Ambassador in that country, who used it for safekeeping her jewelry. Speakes also advised that [ ] loaned an FBI radio generator out to a local Quito radio station. It was necessary for the Bureau to recover this property.

b3 Per CIA

(S)

b1 Per CIA  
b3

You will recall that [ ] was formerly our Legal Attache in Paris, France. After his recall to the United States in April of 1950, he resigned as of July 14, 1950, because of

b3 Per CIA

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b1 Per CIA  
b3

illness in his family.

(S)

His personnel file reflects he entered on duty as a Messenger with the FBI on July 1, 1935. He became an Agent effective May 15, 1939. He became Legal Attache in Paris, France on July 7, 1945.

You will recall that on December 7, 1949, you interviewed [ ] while he was attending In-Service classes, during which interview [ ] showed little knowledge concerning FBI activities occurring in France. This was particularly true concerning the International Criminal Police Commission.

b3 Per CIA

In a memorandum dated January 5, 1950, Mr. J. P. Mohr recommended that [ ] be transferred to Chicago. However, this transfer was later changed due to [ ] request that he be transferred to New York because of having numerous contacts in that city who could be of value to the FBI.

b3 Per CIA

In January of 1950, [ ] called at the Bureau and in an interview with Mr. Mohr intimated his displeasure at being returned to the domestic field.

b3 per CIA

On November 21, 1950, you granted [ ] an interview and expressed the opinion afterwards in a memorandum that his attitude seemed good but time only would tell. [ ] called at this time to pay his respects and to express his appreciation for the time he had been associated with the FBI.

b3

(S)

~~SECRET~~

b3 Per CIA

[REDACTED]

(10) [REDACTED]

b3 Per CIA

(S)

(S)

[REDACTED] he has at all times exhibited a cooperative and friendly attitude toward the Bureau. No derogatory information is known concerning [REDACTED]

b1 Per CIA

b3

His personnel file reveals he entered on duty with the FBI on October 19, 1936. He resigned effective December 13, 1938, in order to accept a position with the Prudential Life Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey. His record with the Bureau reflects no derogatory information.

(11) ERIC WALTER TIMM

[REDACTED]

b3 Per CIA

Timm entered on duty with the FBI on November 6, 1939. He resigned effective May 1, 1944. His efficiency reports ran from an average of Very Good to Excellent. At the time of his resignation he was Unit Chief in charge of the Sabotage Section, Internal Security Division. He was commended by the Director in February of 1943 because of his work in sabotage matters. You will recall that Timm submitted his resignation effective May 1, 1944, indicating he intended to apply for an overseas assignment with the Armed Forces. It was learned, however, that on May 2, 1944, Timm entered on duty with the Office of Strategic Services. At your instructions, Assistant Director Glavin took up with the Civil Service Commission the raiding of Bureau personnel by OSS.

[REDACTED]

b3 Per CIA

~~SECRET~~



SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD

✓ P. King  
December 20, 1951

DIRECTOR, FBI

*All Names Red X'd*

RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

*General*

For your information and guidance, there are attached pertinent blank memoranda concerning the background of former Bureau Agents now employed by the Central Intelligence Agency here in Washington.

This is furnished for your confidential information and for the use of your office in connection with any contacts you might have with these individuals.

Should any information come to your attention regarding these individuals, the Bureau should be immediately advised.

ATTACHMENTS

~~ENCL~~ CWB:mfs

SE ENCL

*James*

*DeBz*

*Vm*

*0-76a3*

*16 JAN 5 1952*

RECEIVED 26 JAN 5 1952

JAN 5 1952

COMM - FBI  
JAN 27 1951  
MAILED 10

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Nichols
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Alor
- Belmont
- Laughlin
- Mohr
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 2/26/52

FROM : J. P. MOHR

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Inspector  
Training and Inspection Division

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Alger \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
b3 Per CIA \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

On February 14, 1952, Mr. Clegg stated he received a telephonic contact from former Special Agent William K. Harvey of CIA who stated that [REDACTED] had submitted an application for employment with CIA. Mr. Harvey wanted to know whether the Bureau would interpose any objection to CIA employing [REDACTED]. Mr. Clegg stated he told Harvey that he had nothing to do with such matters and told him if he wished to pursue the matter further he should take it up with someone in the Administrative Division. Mr. Harvey subsequently called Mr. Glavin and asked him if the Bureau would interpose any objections.

After discussing the matter with you and informing you of our agreement with CIA that they would not employ personnel of this Bureau, I advised Mr. Glavin he should inform Harvey that since we had an agreement with CIA that it would not be possible to make an exception in this case and we could not abrogate the agreement in this instance by making an exception.

The foregoing is submitted for record purposes.

*[Signature]*

JPM:DW

RECORDED-33

2/28/52-21

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: [SOV. T. (S)]  
ESPIONAGE - R~~TOP SECRET~~

DATE: July 1, 1952

Classified by Multiple Sources

Declassify on: OADR

75946

(S) - Appropriate Agency

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.PURPOSE:

To answer your inquiry regarding the background of William K. Harvey, a former special agent in the Bureau of CIA. Harvey, a former special agent in the Bureau, is now Chief of the Planning Staff of the Office of Special Operations of CIA. We have had, in the past, some difficulty with Harvey at CIA; however, recently his attitude has been friendly and cooperative. [redacted] is the head of a unit in CIA which handles work relating to communications intelligence. (S) Per CIA 7/1/52

DETAILS:

In connection with the attached memorandum dated June 23, 1952, regarding a limited discussion to be had with William K. Harvey and [redacted] on Bureau Source cases. You asked concerning the background of Harvey and [redacted] (S) Per CIA 7/1/52

As you may recall, William K. Harvey was a special agent with the Bureau from December 9, 1940, until August 27, 1947. Harvey was a Bureau supervisor from March 27, 1942, until his resignation, primarily handling matters relating to German espionage and Russian espionage. His personnel file reflects he was considered to have a keen analytical mind especially adapted to intelligence work. (S) Per CIA 7/1/52

Harvey, after resigning from the Bureau, became an employee of CIA, presently holding the position of Chief of the Planning Staff of the Office of Special Operations of the CIA. We have had some difficulty with Harvey since he has been with CIA and in June, 1950, we advised Admiral Hillenkoetter, then Director of CIA, that we felt Harvey was hostile to us. Harvey later called at the Bureau and stated he had no hostility towards the Bureau and in fact had the highest regard for the Bureau. At that time, you indicated liaison arrangements could be continued with Harvey as long as his attitude continued to be as indicated in the interview. In recent months Harvey has made statements indicating his desire to cooperate with the Bureau and no indications have been noted to the contrary. (S) Per CIA 7/1/52

RJL:jl(mem)

~~TOP SECRET~~

FEB 18 1986

~~TOP SECRET~~

b3 Per CIA

[redacted] who has been with CIA for a number of years, is the head of a unit in CIA which is engaged in doing work on communications intelligence. This unit works in analyzing and evaluating information

b3 Per CIA

[redacted] and preparing studies in connection with other collateral information which is received by CIA. [redacted] who has been contacted by our liaison representatives from time to time, has always exhibited a cooperative attitude and desire to work with the Bureau. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ per CIA 10/27/59

(U) ~~(S)~~ There is no information in our files reflecting on [redacted] earlier background prior to becoming employed by CIA. It was determined through liaison that he was formerly employed by G-2 and OSS. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ per CIA 10/27/59

b3 Per CIA

ACTION:

The foregoing is in answer to your inquiry concerning the background of these two men. ~~(S)~~ u

While I have approved the project we must be most alert as we know nothing about [redacted] that they he was in OSS & certainly no endorsement in itself & as to whether I doubt if he has ever changed his basic hostility towards the FBI.

b3 Per CIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON *✓*

DATE: September 30, 1952

FROM : J. P. MOHR

SUBJECT: CIA PROSELYTING OF  
BUREAU PERSONNEL

*h. 80 General*

From time to time I have heard bits of information, gossip and rumor to the effect that CIA has actively endeavored to proselyte key Bureau personnel. It has been extremely difficult to verify this information without actually contacting the people who have left the services of the Bureau and gone with CIA. It has been reported that CIA is most anxious to recruit into its service key FBI personnel, particularly those who have excellent backgrounds, training, and experience in Communist and subversive investigations, as well as Soviet espionage investigations.

It has been further reported that CIA has been very disappointed with its own Writing and Research Unit, particularly with respect to Communist activities abroad, and that CIA has endeavored to build up a Writing and Research Unit of the same standard presently enjoyed by the Bureau. I have heard the rumor that CIA personnel have stated the Bureau's Research Desk has been performing outstanding work and that the caliber of the Bureau's work has been a serious reflection on the output of the CIA.

*0-2971*

I have heard that there are two individuals within the CIA who are particularly anxious to recruit key Bureau personnel. One of these persons is former Special Agent William K. Harvey and an individual by the name of [redacted]. I understand that these two persons would utilize any device to proselyte former Bureau personnel and will even go so far as to approach former Bureau personnel presently with CIA to go out and make contact with present and former Bureau employees to entice them with offers of higher grades to go to CIA. I have no way of proving the information which I have received, although I strongly suspect that it's true from circumstances which are apparent in the Bureau's personnel files.

As you know, former Special Agent [redacted] who was assigned to the Training and Inspection Division, filed an application with CIA while still in the Bureau's employ, and

JPM:hc

OCT 10 1952

former Special Agent Harney contacted Mr. Clegg in an effort to secure a release for [redacted] to go directly from the Bureau to CIA in spite of our agreement with CIA that they would not consider any of the people who are presently on the Bureau's rolls. Mr. Harney was told of the Bureau's objections and [redacted] obtained interim employment with the Chelf Committee, entering on duty with CIA apparently on April 14, 1952, in Grade GS-14, at \$10,200 per annum, which was the same grade and salary he was receiving from the Bureau. [redacted] prior to going with CIA, told Mr. Nichols that Communist research was one of his first loves and that he hoped to be able to work on this activity at CIA.

b3 Per CIA

b3 Per CIA

Special Agent [redacted] who entered on duty with the Bureau on July 14, 1941, resigned effective June 2, 1952. At the time he submitted his resignation he said his purpose in resigning was to make arrangements which would enable him to do extensive graduate work in the field of political science with the hope of some day obtaining a teaching position. I have heard that shortly after [redacted] left the Bureau's service he filed application with CIA, and that as a matter of fact, CIA, through regular channels, requested all of the research material that [redacted] had prepared while assigned to the Bureau's Research Unit in the Domestic Intelligence Division in order that they might review it and determine its worth.

b3 Per CIA

[redacted] during the time he was assigned to the Research Unit of the Bureau, turned out some excellent material and he was considered to be a genuine student of Communism and as having an outstanding interest in research. At the time he left the Bureau's service he was in Grade GS-13, at \$8,360 per annum. In the middle of August, 1952, a personal history statement on [redacted] was submitted by CIA indicating he had made application for employment with CIA. Now I understand he is to enter on duty there this week or next week. It has been reported that [redacted] will be utilized by CIA in conducting research work on Communism, particularly on foreign countries.

b3 Per CIA

Special Agent [redacted] entered on duty with the Bureau as a clerical employee June 1, 1937; he was appointed to the position of Special Agent on August 25, 1941. He resigned effective August 8, 1952, at which time he was in Grade GS-13 at \$8560 per annum, and had been recommended for promotion to Grade GS-14 at \$9600 per annum effective July 20, 1952; however, this reallocation was cancelled when [redacted] submitted his resignation. [redacted] in submitting his resignation on July 21, 1952, stated he was doing so in order to



earn more money. He told Mr. Nichols that he had been planning for the past several years to work on a plot of a novel he had in mind which he felt would become a best seller and would give him a financial stake, and that in the meantime he was planning to get a 9-5:30 job so that he could complete his novel, which he had not been able to do while with the Bureau.

[redacted] was a Supervisor in the Crime Records Section and had supervision over the handling of correspondence. He had a very good record in the Bureau's service. It has been reported that [redacted] was approached by CIA representatives while he was still in the Bureau's employ with the view to his taking a position with CIA. I do not know if this is true, but we have in the last few days received a personal history statement on [redacted] indicating he has filed an application for employment with CIA.

b3 Per CIA

Special Agent [redacted] entered on duty with the Bureau as a clerical employee November 7, 1935. He was appointed to the position of Special Agent on January 26, 1942, and he resigned effective June 27, 1952, at which time he was in Grade GS-13 at \$8360 per annum. At the time of his resignation

b3 Per CIA

[redacted] was assigned to the Domestic Intelligence Division where he supervised espionage investigations involving members of the Soviet MGB, which investigations are predicated upon Bureau Source 5 material. [redacted] has an outstanding background in Soviet espionage activities, having secured that background during his long tenure of assignment in the New York City Office prior to coming to the Bureau as a Supervisor on June 4, 1950.

[redacted] in submitting his resignation, stated he was doing so because of pressing personal reasons requiring that he increase his income, and he informed Mr. Hennrich that he had no other employment in mind and frankly indicated he did not plan to secure other government employment. I have heard it said that [redacted] who recently has been in Florida, expects to return to Washington, D. C. and accept employment with CIA.

There have been others who have gone over to CIA recently and leaving the Bureau under rather [redacted] circumstances, and have ended up at CIA. One of these is [redacted] former Supervisor in the Training and Inspection Division, who ended up with CIA and is handling an [redacted]

b3 Per CIA

[redacted] also [redacted] who also was a Supervisor in the Training and Inspection Division and who left the Bureau to secure outside non-government employment, has taken a position with CIA. You will recall that [redacted] is the Agent who wrote the grandiose brochure on his background and experience with the FBI and sent it to numerous business concerns.

The foregoing information is on some of the recent individuals who have gone to CIA, but I think the greatest concern is the attitude which has been reported of Messrs. Harvey and [redacted] to proselyte Bureau employees who have a wealth of Communist and Soviet espionage backgrounds to go to CIA for more money. I also think it is particularly disturbing to think that Messrs Harvey and [redacted] are in the practice of utilizing former Agents now with CIA to proselyte present Bureau employees with the offer of higher grades. I realize that this is merely rumor and that I am unable to find the evidence to substantiate this. The rumors I have heard, however, bits of information that have come to my attention, have come from reliable sources.

b3 Per CIA

I have also heard it rumored that CIA, particularly some of the members in the lower echelons of [redacted] and Harvey's rank, are most anxious to concentrate on research for CIA on Soviet and European Communist activities. It has also been reported, however, that they have the dream of one day taking over Communist and counter-espionage activities in the United States.

b3 Per CIA

I wish it were possible to document the rumors and gossip that I have set forth herein; however, I do not have any way of doing so without suggesting an open inquiry, which I do not think would be desirable at this time. Furthermore, I do not think that the information I have set forth is of sufficient value that we can take it directly to CIA because the net result would merely be haggling without achieving anything, since we do not have positive facts. I do think, however, that the information in this memorandum should be borne in mind for future consideration in connection with our present liaison and other contacts with CIA on an official and personal basis.

✓ J. D. Rush  
There is absolutely no question  
but there is a very definite  
& intensive effort being made  
by CIA to proselyte key Bureau  
personnel & they are attempting  
our staff in violation of all agreed  
memoranda & decency. d.



TO: A. H. Belmont

FROM: J. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: DR. J. ROBERT OELSHOFER  
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCE.  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~

7/27/99

1

Classified by SP6 Bja/ndk  
Declassify on: OADR 13/13/86  
2/6 alt/ag 5/11/84

118

2  
 XEROX  
 FEB 13 1986

~~Random~~ **SECRET** UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT: 11/20/53  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

FROM : H. H. Clegg  
Classified by *Multiple Source Bifurcate*  
Declassify on: OADR 3/15/86  
DECLASSIFY ON: *same 87-0568*

SUBJECT: HANDLING OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM  
ISMAIL AKHMEDOV, was., ESPIONAGE + R

Tolson  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Gearty  
Mohr  
Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Gandy

*W. K. Harvey*

SYNOPSIS Domestic Intelligence

Akhmedov, a career Soviet army officer who had for 8 months been head of Section 4 of Soviet Military Intelligence, defected to Turkey in 1942. On 4/18/47, G-2 inquired if FBI would be responsible for Akhmedov if he was brought to the U. S. On 9/16/47, Bureau advised G-2 we would not be responsible but would like to interview Akhmedov if he came to U.S. Interviews with Akhmedov were conducted by G-2 for FBI and by [redacted] and later, during October-November, 1948, SA Emory Gregg, a Bureau Supervisor, interviewed Akhmedov in Turkey. Gregg's interviews consumed 3 weeks. All information was properly disseminated to other agencies.

On 2/20/53, CIA brought Akhmedov to U. S. He was released from C.I.A. parole according to notification to FBI 3/24/53. Akhmedov was next interviewed by FBI 9/23/53. He has since been interviewed several times and more interviews will be held.

On 10/29/53, Akhmedov testified before the Jenner Committee. The Director has inquired as to:

1. Had we received initially all the information which Akhmedov gave Jenner Committee?

Answer: No. he testified as to two things we did not know about:

FOI/PA # 7167,700  
APPEAL #  
CIVIL ACT. #  
E.O. # 12356  
DATE 3/13/80 INITIALS WKE

A. In our 1948 interview we did not ask Akhmedov about the Institute of Pacific Relations. On 10/29/53 Akhmedov told Jenner Committee the Institute had been used by a Soviet Espionage Section as early as 1941. UN-54 4 20 BH

B. In 1948 Akhmedov told SA Gregg about plans for a 1941 model tank and data on a small caliber gun received from a source he named [redacted] from the U. S. On 10/29/53 [redacted] testified before the Jenner Committee the [redacted] a [redacted]

30 DEC 16 1953

CLASSIFIED BY *60909/609/61*  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 6  
**SECRET**  
FEB 18 1986  
*4-21-83*  
*981541 as amended*  
*ACKNOWLEDGED 11 MAR 7 1982*  
*70-18-12 9-12-82*

2. (U) The Director inquired whether CIA had received all information which Akhmedov later gave to the Jenner Committee: ~~SECRET~~

Answer: No. Situation same as FBI.

3. The Director inquired as to the investigative steps we took in 1947.

Answer: (U) We had G-2 interview Akhmedov in Turkey until Agent Gregg interviewed him personally in October-November 1948. (S) (u) ~~SECRET~~ (S) (u) PER DIA Ltr 4-20-89

(S) A separate memorandum has been submitted regarding the investigative aspects, and explanations as to certain points are now being obtained from New York, Newark, Los Angeles and the Domestic Intelligence Divisions. Full findings will be submitted to Director promptly.

b3  
b7D

4. Director inquired as to whether we are in the clear in the Akhmedov matter.

Answer: In addition to certain investigative aspects for which explanations are now being obtained we regard the following as weaknesses:

(S) (u) PER DIA Ltr 4-20-89  
G-2 inquired by letter 4/17/47 whether it was possible to bring Akhmedov to the U.S. and if so be responsible; should Akhmedov remain in U.S. after exploitation? He answered 9/18/47 at which time G-2 was told we could not be responsible for Akhmedov but would like to interview him.

5. The Executives Conference did not consider this matter until 3/4/47 because for Mr. William A. Harvey (now at CIA) "sat on" the matter until he resigned 1/1/48 at which time a memo to the Director and a memorandum was prepared 2/1/47. ~~SECRET~~ (u) (S) (u)

~~SECRET~~

- C. Keith Coyne's memorandum for the Executive Conference addendum (9/4/47) mentioned the C-2 inquiry had been received 4/10/47. (S)(X)(U) per DEA let 4/20/89

- D. On 7/31/48 Bureau learned the military did not plan to bring Akhmedov to the U. S. On 9/7/48 Director OK'd sending Agent Gregg to Turkey to interview Akhmedov. Gregg interviewed him for 3 weeks ending in November 1948. Although Gregg interviewed Internal Security-Espionage Supervisors and representative of Cryptographic Section prior to departure and made extensive preparations (results of C-2 [redacted] solicited field for questions, prepared albums and questionnaires) before leaving the specific instructions to Gregg were to "interview Akhmedov and display to him photographs of individuals now only tentatively identified with Soviet agents said by him to be active in the U.S. . . . to fully exploit this source." (S)(X)(U) per DEA let 4/20/89

b3  
b7D

Gregg did not:

1. Interview Akhmedov regarding the "Pacific Relations." This was an Internal Security investigation in 1948 and became an espionage matter in 1950. Mr. Belmont pointed out there were several hundred Communist front organizations in the U. S. in 1948 and Gregg did not interview Akhmedov regarding them. The interview, according to Belmont, was concerned mainly with Espionage bearing in mind Akhmedov was a career army officer with only 6 months intelligence experience and Akhmedov had never been to the U. S. Because Gregg received instructions "to fully exploit this source" we believe he should have interviewed Akhmedov regarding "Pacific Relations." (S)(X)(U)

~~SECRET~~

(3)

~~SECRET~~

2. Show negative answers to broad questions and topics in recording the results of the interview. For example, the Bureau file does not show that Akhmedov did not know the source in U. S. of tank and gun information. Gregg did not record in the file the fact he had tried to get facts as to the U. S. source from Akhmedov. He did, however, record negative information in those instances wherein Akhmedov was unable to identify photographs of individuals which SA Gregg had shown him. Page 35 of Part 1 of FBI Handbook permits summarizing results of investigation when findings are negative. This rule was in effect in 1958. (U)

~~(S)~~ (U) E. Akhmedov arrived in U. S. 2/20/53; [he] was released from CIA parole, according to notification to FBI, on 3/24/53 and was not interviewed by Bureau Agents until 9/23/53. SA James E. Wallace, to whom case has been assigned since Akhmedov's return to U. S., is of opinion [all necessary information was being] (U) adequately elicited by CIA as result of Bureau liaison with CIA. Mr. Belmont states that although there were no particular questions for Akhmedov after his arrival in U. S. and the field was advised in July 1953 that Akhmedov was an available source of information, Akhmedov should have been interviewed as a precautionary measure. He feels he should have been promptly and thoroughly interviewed. (U)

- F. Whenever it can be established a defector is reliable and not a (double agent) and interview with the defector who has information as to Sources or Satellite activities should be all inclusive. [What one of those individuals is, or was, or may be, is not the point.] (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)(U) PAR 4-20-89

- G. Information from Akhmedov received from G-2 4/18/47 was not sent to the field until 12/17/47; [redacted]

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b7D

[redacted] ~~(S)~~ This should have been done more promptly. This phase of the Akhmedov case took place prior to Mr. Belmont's assignment as Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Mr. D. M. Ladd - censure . . . for his responsibility as official in charge of investigations and for the weaknesses previously cited in this memorandum. Mr. Belmont analyzed this situation and felt that Mr. Ladd's instructions to Agent Gregg were adequate. Mr. Belmont feels Mr. Ladd took the necessary steps to see that everything pertinent was covered in the interview by Gregg with Akhmedov in 1948. (S)(U)

2. SA Emory M. Gregg - censure . . . because he did not completely "milk" Akhmedov and fully protect the bureau with a synopsis of negative findings on all broad topics. Brief attached. Mr. Belmont objects to censuring Gregg because he believes Gregg adequately interviewed Akhmedov (see attached memo) (S)(U)

3. SA James E. Wallace - censure . . . for not having arranged for prompt FBI interview of Akhmedov after release from CIA parole 3/24/53. Akhmedov was interviewed by FBI 9/23/53. Brief attached. Belmont agrees. (S)(U)

4. Mr. A. N. Belmont - censure . . . as head of Domestic Intelligence Division he should have had things organized so that Akhmedov would be promptly interviewed. Belmont agrees. (S)(U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5. Mr. Belmont should see that Akhmedov is thoroughly and completely interviewed as to all matters of Bureau interest. Belmont agrees.

6. Negative findings as to broad topics relating to persons and organizations should be synopsized and grouped for future use in the Bureau files following interviews with defectors. The FBI handbook permits synopsizing negative findings. Mr. Belmont agrees that negative replies should be recorded when significant.

7. Mr. Belmont should see to it that all aspects of the security field are covered in interviews with defectors, espionage agents and highly placed Communists. This line of thinking should be present in all security investigations so that no aspect will be overlooked. Mr. Belmont agrees and states this has been stressed to the field in a series of SAC Letters, four of which were dated in 1958.

8. Former SA William K. Harvey - recommend a copy of this memorandum be placed in his personnel file.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

9. Former SA Joseph Patrick ~~Coyne~~ - recommend a copy of this memorandum be placed in his personnel file.

✓  
JZ  
11/22  
DJ

Ar.  
K1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

It is noted that on 11-29-53 Ismail Akhmedov, a former official of Soviet Military Intelligence, was interviewed before the Jenner Committee, at which time he furnished considerable information about activities of Soviet Military Intelligence.

(U) In view of Akhmedov's recent testimony before the Jenner Committee, the Director has raised the following questions: whether we had interviewed Akhmedov and had gotten all the information he had furnished the Jenner Committee; and if Akhmedov had been handled by Central Intelligence Agency, did they obtain all the information Akhmedov furnished to the Jenner Committee. (S) (X) (U) The Director also inquired as to what investigative steps the Bureau took in 1947 on the information furnished by Akhmedov to G-2 concerning the existence of Soviet spy rings in the United States and further inquired as to whether we were in the clear in this matter. (S) (X) (U)

G-2 info Declassified  
per DPA let 4-20-89

BUREAU INTERVIEWS WITH AKHMEDOV

Akhmedov, former official of Soviet Military Intelligence, defected to Turkey in 1942. [In 1947 Akhmedov furnished information to G-2 regarding the existence of spy rings in the United States, which information was reported by G-2 to the Bureau 4-18-47. At the same time the Bureau's advice was requested as to whether: (S) (X) (U)]

1. It would be worth while to bring Akhmedov to the United States.
2. Would the Bureau be responsible for him.
3. Should he be permitted to remain after his exploitation. (S) (X) (U)

After careful review by the Bureau and consideration by the Executives Conference, Military Intelligence was advised on 9-16-47, that although we could not be responsible for Akhmedov, we would appreciate an opportunity to interview him should he be brought to the United States by the Military. Inquiry shows that former SA Supervisor William K. Harvey now with CIA held the Akhmedov matter in the Internal Security Section of the Bureau until 8-25-47, the date of his resignation, without the matter (S) (X) (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

being presented to the Executives Conference. At the time of SA Harvey's resignation, much of his work was inherited by SA R. G. Fletcher, now assigned to the San Francisco Office, who vividly recalls that as soon as he located the Akhmedov matter among materials previously held by SA Harvey, he immediately took it to the then Section Chief, former SA J. P. Coyne, and on Mr. Coyne's instruction immediately prepared a memorandum dated 8-29-47, for consideration by the Executives Conference. Mr. Ladd has a recollection that there was considerable conversation on this matter between the Bureau's Liaison Section and the Military prior to the date the Akhmedov matter was presented to the Executives Conference. The Akhmedov file does not reflect such conferences between Liaison and the Military. Former SA Coyne's memorandum of 8-29-47, contains an addendum showing that the Executives Conference on 8-4-47, concurred that the Bureau could not be responsible for Akhmedov coming to the U. S. but would like an opportunity to interview him. Neither former SA Coyne's memorandum, which was prepared by SA R. G. Fletcher, nor the addendum shows that the Akhmedov information had been received 4-18-47, by the Bureau.

After extensive file reviews at the Bureau, Akhmedov's information was disseminated to the [redacted]

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and to the field service October 17, 1948. On 11-11-48, the Bureau presented eight questions to Military Intelligence for their presentation to Akhmedov. The Military reply was received by the Bureau 4-6-49. During this same period there were additional [redacted]

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[redacted] All during the period of [redacted] to 10-17-48, when SA Gregg departed for Turkey, the field was conducting investigations, and the Bureau was continuing its file reviews and the correlating of the information in the files with that previously obtained from Akhmedov. The Bureau was also accumulating photographs and gathering other data for presentation to Akhmedov by G-2 or the Bureau should he be brought to the United States. On 7-21-48, the Bureau learned from the Military that they would not bring Akhmedov to the U.S., and on 9-7-48 the Director OK'd sending an agent to interview Akhmedov in Turkey. SA Emory M. Gregg interviewed Akhmedov in Turkey during October and November, 1948. [redacted] u

Following the completion of the interview, Akhmedov, according to SA Gregg, stated he feared he (Akhmedov) would never get to the U. S., because now he had been questioned exhaustively about everything he knew, and there would be no reason for the FBI to intercede for his admission into the U. S. [redacted] u

~~SECRET~~

SA Gregg advises that he was convinced that Akhmedov had withheld nothing and had furnished all the information he could at that time. SA Gregg advises as best he can recall he returned from Turkey about the middle of November, 1947, that he was immediately tied up on the "Sorge" case. His first memorandum on information obtained from Akhmedov is dated 12-27-47. The results of SA Gregg's interview with Akhmedov have been appropriately disseminated. (U)

(U) All topics discussed negatively by SA Gregg with Akhmedov were not covered in the memoranda which SA Gregg prepared on his return. SA Gregg did record negative information in those instances wherein Akhmedov was unable to identify photographs of individuals shown to him by SA Gregg. Mr. Belmont does not think that the Bureau should require that all negative information be incorporated in interviews. He states the only logical way to do this is by means of a question and answer method, which is not best suited to the Bureau's needs. Using the Akhmedov interview as an example, Mr. Belmont points out that if we had listed all the questions resulting in negative replies, we would have voluminous and worthless information in the Akhmedov file. It is Mr. Belmont's feeling that to report such negative information merely for protection purposes does not appear to be worth while. It is his view that where a question is significant and a negative reply is significant, it should be recorded as is the present policy. Mason's position differs from that of Mr. Belmont in that Mason feels:

1. In an interview with a defector who is reliable, negative answers to questions on broad topics (such as knowledge of persons and organizations) should be recorded in summary form in the Bureau file.
2. Recording such data will be helpful in future evaluation and control of informant.
3. We have to protect the record because of intense interest of Congressional Committees in security topics, their frequent reinterviews with defectors, and the fact that defectors sometimes change their stories. We have this very situation in the Akhmedov matter.

(U) Akhmedov arrived in the United States 2-20-53, and his parole to CIA was terminated by announcement to the FBI on 3-24-53. He was next interviewed by Bureau Agents 9-23-53. He should have been interviewed earlier and Mr. Belmont agrees this should have been done as a precautionary measure.

In addition to the [redacted] inter-  
 viewed by Bureau Agents 9-23-53, 10-13-53, [redacted] in Washington;  
 10-28-53 in New York; 11-5-53 and 11-17-53 in Washington. The  
 Bureau now has a copy of the manuscript of the book Akhmedov  
 is writing. Future interviews will also bring out the source of  
 the information Akhmedov gave the Jenner Committee.

INFORMATION NOT PREVIOUSLY KNOWN TO  
 BUREAU REVEALED TO JENNER COMMITTEE

In Akhmedov's testimony before the Jenner Committee on  
 10-29-53 he specifically mentioned, among other things, two  
 items which are not reflected in information which he [previously  
 furnished to SA Gregg.] (S) (u)

1. That a member of his staff in 1941 had suggested the  
 Institute of Pacific Relations as a source of intelligence informa-  
 tion, but he was informed by another Soviet Intelligence Section  
 that this other Soviet Intelligence Section was already using  
 the Institute of Pacific Relations.

[The first information relative to Akhmedov's knowledge  
 of the Institute of Pacific Relations came to the Bureau in a  
 letter from CIA dated 9-23-53. CIA received no information from  
 Akhmedov re Institute of Pacific Relations until after Akhmedov  
 had read in the U. S. News and World Report magazine of 3-28-53  
 a portion of a Jenner Committee report which mentioned the  
 Institute of Pacific Relations.] (S) (u)

Mr. Belmont points out Akhmedov was a career Red Army  
 officer (1929 - 1942) with only one year of intelligence work;  
 the interview by Gregg was concerned mainly with espionage;  
 Akhmedov told Gregg that he was not versed in Communist ideology;  
 Akhmedov did not mention the Institute of Pacific Relations. (S) (u)  
 It is our belief that Akhmedov should have been asked about the  
 Institute of Pacific Relations, and his reply, even though negative,  
 should have been reduced to writing in the Bureau's files.

2. Akhmedov specifically mentioned to the Jenner  
 Committee seeing information (in the form of blueprints, photo-  
 graphs and technical data) from the Aberdeen Proving Ground,  
 Aberdeen, Maryland, which was received by Soviet Intelligence  
 through Amtorg, the Soviet trading company in New York.

(S) (u) Akhmedov had previously furnished information to SA  
 Gregg, as well as CIA, that the Soviets had been obtaining  
 technical intelligence from the U. S. through one Zorin, who  
 was in the United States serving as Chief Engineer of Amtorg. (S) (u)  
 Akhmedov had further pointed out to [both] the Bureau and CIA that  
 various blueprints, photographs and technical data had been (S) (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Gregg, although he did not specifically mention this type coming specifically from any one place. Akhmedov told Gregg (1948) he did not know the source. Gregg did not so state in a memorandum. Mr. Belmont points out that Akhmedov told Agent Gregg he was a career Red Army officer and was not versed in Communist ideology. Upon reinterview in October, 1953, Akhmedov changed the story that he had initially given Agent Gregg. Mr. Belmont advises that when Akhmedov was recently questioned as to why he had not furnished information as to the Aberdeen Proving Ground to Agent Gregg, Akhmedov was very vague and attributed the refreshing of his memory to having read a book by Whitaker Chambers. (S)u

#### ARE WE CLEAR IN THIS MATTER

Akhmedov's information has been disseminated into a minimum of 29 Bureau files wherein investigation has been or is being conducted. These files are being reviewed, and the results thereof will be submitted in a separate memorandum.

The information obtained from Akhmedov has been appropriately disseminated to interested agencies in the United States [redacted] b1 b3

#### WEAKNESSES

1. Akhmedov was interviewed by Agent Gregg in Turkey for three weeks during October - November, 1948. Gregg's instructions were to interview Akhmedov, display photographs of individuals tentatively identified as Soviet agents in the United States, fully exploit Akhmedov. Mr. Belmont advises Gregg did not ask Akhmedov regarding the Institute of Pacific Relations, nor did he ask him about several hundred other Communist front organizations in the United States. Gregg took with him, however, for purposes of interview, the results of extensive preparations (according to Belmont) including the results of G-2 interrogations, [redacted] (S)u

(U) [redacted] consultations by Gregg with espionage and internal security supervisors at the Bureau, results of consultation with the Cryptographic Section, the results of a field solicitation for questions to be put to Akhmedov and a series of albums and questionnaires for use in the interview with Akhmedov. As Mr. Belmont points out, Akhmedov was a career army officer who had about one year of intelligence experience and he claimed he was not versed in Communist ideology. Akhmedov told Gregg he had no information on Communist infiltration into U. S. organizations. On the other hand, CIA reported 9-23-53, that it was not until Akhmedov had read a magazine article on 8-28-53, that Akhmedov realized there was [redacted] (S)u



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Mr. Belmont states that although there were no particular questions to ask Akhmedov after Akhmedov arrived in the U. S. and the field was informed July, 1953, of the availability of Akhmedov as a source of information, Mr. Belmont agrees that as a precautionary measure Akhmedov should have been interviewed.

4. <sup>GU</sup> During the course of SA Gregg's interview of Akhmedov he received information that the Soviets had received data on small caliber guns blueprints and for a 1941 model tank. The results of this interview do not reflect that Akhmedov was questioned as to the exact source of this data. Gregg states he did question Akhmedov at length and in great detail as to the source of all data and attempted to get from Akhmedov the location from which the data came but that Akhmedov did not know the source. This particular point is not covered in the memoranda prepared by SA Gregg, but SA Gregg recalls Akhmedov having told him that Soviet agents rarely reveal their sources even to their superiors. When questioned by Washington Field Office Agents on 10/24, 25/53, Akhmedov demonstrated that he had a wealth of detailed knowledge as to where the information had come from and how it was obtained. This information was contained in WFO air-tel 10-25 to the effect Akhmedov reported: Red Army Intelligence had well established source at Aberdeen Proving Ground; source furnished information in form of photostats, photographs and blueprints through Zorin; Akhmedov had seen the dossier of this source while he was head of Section 4 of Red Army Intelligence; Akhmedov recalls the source was an American citizen but cannot recall true, cover or code name; would not recognize name or photograph of source; source not dispatched from Russia; source recruited in United States but Akhmedov does not recall when or by whom; source never visited Soviet Union; source actually employed at Aberdeen Proving Ground and presumably on a technical job; Arshak Armenakovich Vartanian told Akhmedov of the source, and Vartanian used the source; and other details were furnished.

It is Mr. Belmont's position that since Akhmedov has changed his story from that which he <sup>GU</sup> gave Agent Gregg in 1948 and even now does not provide any specifics which can be traced; therefore, we should place more reliance in the original statement of Akhmedov than in his most recent statement.

It is our position that Gregg did not adequately protect the Bureau's interest by preparing a memorandum as to the lack of knowledge of Akhmedov as to the source of information regarding 1941 model tanks and small caliber gun data.

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There is now no way of determining whether Akhmedou's memory was faulty at the time of SA Gregg's interview and has been since refreshed or whether the latest information he has given regarding the Aberdeen Proving Ground is fact or fiction. It may be concluded, however, that the Bureau was not aware that the data mentioned in 1948 came from Aberdeen Proving Ground until five years later and that the Bureau's position was not protected in the meantime by appropriate memoranda for the file following SA Gregg's interview as to these specific points.

5. (Any interview with a defector who has information as to Soviet or Satellite activities should be all-inclusive.) What one of these individuals regards as espionage we in the FBI may regard as internal security-type investigations or security matter - C investigations, or vice versa. Mr. Belmont states his division has recognized the problem and continually stressed it to the field. Mr. Belmont points out that Bureau Bulletin 48 dated 11-29-51, requires the utmost exploitation of an informant's knowledge and the conducting of interviews over an extended period of time after careful preparation and with appropriate channeling of information to individual case files. Supervision of this should be intensified, inasmuch as there appears to have been a gap in this instance.

6. (G-2 offered Akhmedou to us 4-18-47) We declined 9-16-47. It might appear that this decision took undue time.

Responsibility: former SA William K. Harvey. Section Chief was former SA Joseph Patrick Coyne.

7. (The G-2 offer for the FBI to assume responsibility for Akhmedou (4-18-47) was not presented to the Executives Conference until 9-4-47.

Responsibility: former SA William K. Harvey, whose file reflects Mr. Ladd regarded him as a known procrastinator. Coyne was Section Chief.

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8. Information received through G-2 (4-18-47) from  
Ahmedou was not sent to FBI field until 10-17-47.

(S-7)(U) per DEANet 4-20-89

~~SECRET~~

March 18, 1958

The Alumni Secretary  
Indiana University  
Bloomington, Indiana

Dear Sir:

Receipt is acknowledged of your inquiry dated March 5, 1958, regarding Mr. William King Harvey.

Mr. Harvey resigned from the Federal Bureau of Investigation effective August 22, 1947. Information has been received that his present address is USBER, APO 742, New York, New York.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-10-03 BY 60324~~

Miss Jane Roman of CIA advised SA J. M. Fitzgerald on 3-17-58, that it will be satisfactory to furnish the above address of Mr. Harvey to Indiana University. She advised us not to indicate that he is associated with CIA. ~~(S)~~ (U)

8-21-03


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Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM ☐

idum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

FROM : Mr. E. R. Roach

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
STATUS OF RELATIONS

DATE: July 22, 1958

JUNE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Classified by: [redacted]  
Declassify on: OADR

SYNOPSIS:

Summarized analysis of current relations with CIA set forth. This believed timely in light of CIA's expanding operations, continuing areas of potential conflict and probability of stiff criticism of CIA for failure to cover recent Middle East crisis. Relations with Legal Attaches: CIA never in favor of our Legal Attache system. Conflicts have been few. Because of extent our operations that country is key spot for CIA, this area is a source of relations problems in future. CIA personnel outwardly friendly but not cooperative. CIA officials unfriendly. Agency has made inroads. Relations in other locales good. Interrogation of Aliens in U.S.A.: We have been successful in holding CIA to agreement not to interview aliens without first checking with Bureau. We recently strengthened our position. Development of Sources in U.S.A.: If CIA develops sources of foreign positive intelligence information in U.S.A., we are to be informed in order to determine if source first can be exploited for internal security purposes. CIA has been furnishing such information. Operation of Double Agents: Clear-cut understanding that CIA will not develop double agents in U.S. No evidence violation of this understanding. If CIA double comes to U.S. from abroad, we are advised in order to determine if we are interested in utilizing directly or through CIA. This arrangement so far has been satisfactory. Handling of Leads: CIA handling of leads generally slow. Membership - Intelligence Advisory Committee: Most of Committee's work of nature not requiring Bureau action. Membership of value if we are to protect interests and keep abreast of developments in U.S. intelligence field. Defectors: System of processing defectors through Interagency Defector Committee (IDC) seems to be effective and there has been minimum of problems. Tours: We afford tours for visiting police and security officials. We do not arrange meeting with Director unless a Legal Attache is involved and he makes recommendation. Impersonations: Incidents involving alleged representation with FBI by CIA personnel now very rare. Bureau's vigorous efforts to curb such activity have been productive.

SJP:bjt  
(5)

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Fapich

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3/17/86  
INITIALS

Reorganization with  
62-80750-316  
JUL 29 1958  
FEB 1958

(S) is CIA

Memorandum Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont  
RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
STATUS OF RELATIONS

~~SECRET~~

CIA may have helped to practically eliminate such incidents. Stature of CIA: Agency now organization of approximately [redacted] employees, budget appropriation about [redacted] in process of constructing [redacted] building. Despite series of investigations and surveys over years, Agency so far has not materially suffered. Heretofore, surveys never have hit at heart of CIA's problems and have been of whitewash nature. Allen Dulles appears to be secure as Director through 1960, although his position may be shaky in light of recent Middle East crisis. There is no doubt Agency has become powerful. Its wide range of activities places it in influential position, even to point of affecting development of foreign policy, a potentially dangerous trend. Evaluation of coverage in different areas through world set out. Top Accomplishments: [redacted] b1 Per CIA b3

[redacted] Hunter project provides accessibility to corres-  
[redacted] sion. [redacted] b1 Per CIA b3

[redacted] Deficiencies: Agency large, unwieldy organization, never properly administered because of top-heavy administration at headquarters; compartmentation of operations leads to duplication, lack of needed coordination and delays. Agency is a haven for boondoggler types; propensity for hiring the Ivy League "intellectual" who dominates top strata. [redacted] b1 Per CIA b3

[redacted] Undesirable types in organizations such as Radio Free Europe; lack of rigid inspection system. Key Officials: Dulles continues friendly and cooperative; Cabell offers no trouble and it appears he has ambitions to become Director; Robert Amory not friendly; Wisner controversial, outwardly does not appear unfriendly but we must be circumspect with him; Colonel Edwards, Director of Security, cooperative; James Angleton considered to be cooperative and helpful. Ex-Bureau agents have not been able to obtain top positions. Ivy Leaguers do not like ex-Bureau types. [redacted] b1 Per CIA b3

[redacted] Technical Capabilities: Agency has made good progress in photographic and audio surveillance fields. Getting results in document work but employs expensive [redacted] b1 Per CIA b3

~~SECRET~~

b1 Per CIA  
b3 [redacted] Let

Memorandum Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont  
RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
STATUS OF RELATIONS

b1 Per CIA  
b3

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] In certain fields, we and CIA are achieving similar results but we do it faster, with less personnel and cheaper. CIA spending heavily in research. Communications Intelligence: CIA wants to dominate this field and would like powers of National Security Agency (NSA); so far blocked. Not known how much CIA collected in way of ciphers and codes [redacted]

Press and Congress: Agency now organized to maintain good relations with press and Congress. Stories are planted to put Agency in favorable light. Close liaison reportedly maintained with Congress. Security Risks: In its history, CIA has employed many individuals who were security risks. Most questionable types may have been removed but Agency still has individuals whom we would never consider for employment. For example, CIA still employs William Bundy, who contributed to Alger Hiss defense fund.

CIA Attitude Toward Bureau: Elements exist which feel we are out to take over world-wide intelligence. Some believe we should stay out of intelligence field and restrict activity to law enforcement. Over-all respect for Bureau efficiency, tenacity and speed in tackling problems. Many feel CIA needs tight administration like Bureau. Some believe we should expand coverage of friendly country establishments. Many in opposition to our Legal Attache operations. Some are against our policy on dissemination of information. Some hope CIA can achieve position whereby we would become dependent for information on items such as identities of foreign espionage agents, double agents and there is desire for joint operations. Attitude Toward Liaison Agent: Many dislike arrangement which has given Bureau representative unusual access to many of CIA's well-compartmented operations. This feeling offers no problem at present. Outlook for Future Relations: Relations should continue sound through 1960. Periodic conflicts will arise because of natural tendency of overlapping of matters of mutual interest. We can periodically expect issues in area such as [redacted] where both agencies have extensive operations. [redacted] may receive more information from CI [redacted] all of which will require close and sensitive dealings with the Agency. We can expect problems in defector field, primarily because each defector invariably introduces a new problem [redacted]

b1 Per CIA  
b3  
b1 Per CIA  
b3

ACTION:

None. For information.

~~SECRET~~

I can't say how much more we can do. I think it's a matter of time before we can do more. I think it's a matter of time before we can do more. I think it's a matter of time before we can do more.

Memorandum Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont  
RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
STATUS OF RELATIONS

~~SECRET~~

Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, has been friendly and cooperative. He frequently volunteers information of interest. He sometimes gives the impression of being rather naive on certain matters, but basically he is capable of being very cunning and clever. He is not particularly popular within CIA, primarily because much of his work is of an inspection nature, checks on employees and operations. His use of the polygraph on employees never has been well received, particularly when the polygraph examinations delve into the private lives of employees. (S) (X) ~~Per CIA 2/7/89~~ (u)

James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, probably has done more for the Bureau than any other official in CIA. He is an extremely imaginative, clever individual, sincerely devoted to his work. He is considered to be only a fair administrator. He has an unusual gift of analyzing, developing and following double agent operations. He dislikes tight controls over his operations and has an inclination to move into projects regardless of the views of his superiors. For this very reason, it is necessary to follow all dealings with him very diligently since he may unintentionally initiate activity which could be prejudicial to our interests. (S) (X) ~~Per CIA 2/7/89~~ (u)

Lyman E. Kirkpatrick, Inspector General, continues to be a good friend of the Bureau. Kirkpatrick undoubtedly would have moved to a higher position in CIA and possibly could have become Director if he had not been crippled by polio. He still is most active, works every day and is definitely a key official in the organization. (S) (X) ~~Per CIA 2/7/89~~ (u)

The top positions in CIA continue to be dominated by Ivy League types from Princeton, Harvard and Yale. These individuals sometimes have been referred to as the "Georgetown Crowd." If you are not one of them, you allegedly have little chance of achieving a top position in CIA. It is significant that ex-Bureau personnel is not included at the Deputy Director's echelon. (S) (X) ~~Per CIA 2/7/89~~ (u)

(u) (S) Eric Timm, a former Agent, is in charge of the Western Europe Desk (GS-17); William Harvey, ex-Agent, is in charge of the [redacted] (GS-17); [redacted] (GS-17); [redacted] ex-Agent, is an assistant to Colonel Sheffield Edwards (GS-17 or GS-16) and [redacted] ex-Agent, is one of the key officials in the [redacted] (GS-16). (S) (X) ~~Per CIA 2/7/89~~ (u)

The Ivy Leaguers allegedly fear that the establishment of an ex-Bureau clique in CIA is dangerous. This feeling has periodically caused friction both at headquarters and in the field. (S) (X) ~~Per CIA 2/7/89~~ (u)

There are several other CIA officials with whom we have frequent dealings. At the present time, there is none which is giving us any relations problem. (S) (X) ~~Per CIA 2/7/89~~ (u)



~~SECRET~~

DATE: 10-20-58

~~SEE REVERSE  
SIDE FOR  
CLASSIFICATION  
ACTION~~

GOVERNMENT

10-20-58

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Board  
Belmont  
Mohr  
Nease  
Parsons  
Rosen  
Tamm  
Trotter  
Clay  
Tele. Rm.  
Holloman  
Gandy

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
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Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Mr. Harvey is listed in the June, 1957, membership directory for the Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, and his residence is listed as 1615 Northwood Drive, Indianapolis, Indiana, (Attorney). No changes were listed for Mr. Harvey in the July, 1958, Supplemental Membership Directory.

FDH/dan (20)  
Attachment (Permanent Brief)

APR 30 1956

~~SECRET~~

3/24



1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Mr. Papich  
Mr. Mohr  
Liaison Section  
October 22, 1958

Legal Attache, Bonn

Director, FBI

~~SECRET~~

WILLIAM KING HARVEY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OPERATIONS IN BERLIN

9/19/88 [Signature]  
CLASSIFIED BY [Signature]  
87-0568 715 Wkt/eg  
5/11/89

(U) Harvey, a former Bureau Agent, is in charge of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations in Berlin. He entered on duty with the Bureau as an Agent on December 9, 1940, and voluntarily resigned August 22, 1947. In the same year he became employed by CIA. In 1950 the Bureau received information indicating that Harvey was unfriendly and hostile toward the Bureau. In September, 1952, a Bureau official reported that Harvey was engaged in the proselyting of Bureau personnel for CIA. We have had little or no dealings with Harvey since 1952.

Although it is realized that you will not have occasion to deal with Harvey, you nevertheless should be certain that you be most circumspect in any contact which you may have with him at any time in the future.

- 1 - London
- 1 - Madrid
- 1 - Paris
- 1 - Rome

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8-21-03 CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60240/SC/6/6/6/6  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X  
# 981541

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit

NOTE:

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED  
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)  
DATE: 5-8-91

Cover memo Roach to Belmont dated 10-21-58, captioned "William King Harvey, Former Special Agent," SJP:jlh:mtb.

SJP:jlh:mtb  
(12)

LEGAT  
10 OCT 24  
COMM - FBI

FOI/PA # 267,1000  
APPEAL #  
CIVIL ACT. #  
E.O. # 12356  
DATE 3/13/86 INITIALS [Signature]

~~SECRET~~

MAIL ROOM ☐

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
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Gandy \_\_\_\_\_  
W. C. Sullivan

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

**SECRET**

DATE: October 21, 1958

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: WILLIAM KING HARVEY  
FORMER SPECIAL AGENT

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
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Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

W. G. Sullivan

Reference is made to memorandum dated October 20, 1958, from Mr. Tavel to Mr. Mohr, summarizing a brief concerning the captioned individual. The brief contained derogatory information concerning Harvey who is currently in charge of Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) operations in Berlin. The Director made the notation "I assume our foreign offices have been alerted as to Harvey. H."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Classified by SP-6 B. J. Balade  
Declassify on: OADR 1/3/86  
275000/005-1189  
[per WFOA 7/1/89] (u)

**ACTION:**

We have not heretofore advised our Legats of Harvey's attitude toward the Bureau because his work in Berlin did not place him in contact with the Legats. However, there is enclosed herewith a letter to the Legal Attache, Bonn, with copies to other Legal Attaches in Europe, requesting that they be very circumspect in any dealings which they may have with Harvey.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Foreign Liaison
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

SJP:jlh:mtb  
(6)

FOI/PA # 267/100  
APPEAL # \_\_\_\_\_  
CIVIL ACT. # \_\_\_\_\_  
E.O. # 12350  
DATE 3/13/86 INITIALS rule

CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60290/29/deg/bs  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X  
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#981541

As a matter of course we should alert our Field offices & Legal Attaches of background of any ex-employee who is assigned to an area in which we have an office.

**SECRET**

APR 30 1959

FEB 18 1986

Per routing slip from Mr. Tavel to Mr. Roach. SADD's address set up to through service record inquiries & disciplinary separations applicable - 11-17-58



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

**SECRET**

DATE: 9-4-59

FROM : F. A. FROHBOSE

SUBJECT: WILLIAM KING (HARVEY)  
FORMER BUREAU AGENT  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
BUFILE 67-168897

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
McGuire \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Harvey entered on duty with the Bureau as an Agent on 12-9-40, and voluntarily resigned on 8-22-47. In the same year he became employed by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In 1950 the Bureau received information indicating that Harvey was unfriendly and hostile toward the Bureau. In September, 1952, a Bureau official reported that Harvey was engaged in the proselyting of Bureau personnel for CIA. We have had little or no dealings with Harvey since 1952, in which year he became the head of CIA's operations in Berlin. Our Legal Attaches were instructed to be circumspect in the event they had any contact with him.

For your information, Harvey has been transferred to CIA headquarters and is scheduled to become the chief [redacted] b3 Per CIA

[redacted] It has been necessary to maintain Liaison with this staff in order to acquire information needed in many of our sensitive cases.

9-17-83 P-10642 dtd. 9-2-83 8-21-83 CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60290 Bep/ky/lt  
ACTION: [redacted] DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

The Liaison Agent is in a position to maintain contact without dealing with the head of the staff of a regular basis. Therefore, if you approve, Liaison will continue contacts with this staff, and any dealings with Harvey, which should be few, will be held on a circumspect basis. b3 Per CIA

SJP/nmp  
(6)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Wells
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich
- 1 - yellow - 62-80750

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Classified by [redacted]  
Declassify on: OADR 7/14/86

FOI/PA # 267,700  
APPEAL #  
CIVIL ACT. #  
F.O. # 1-350  
DATE 3/14/86 INITIALS [redacted]  
[redacted] CIA

**SECRET**

XEROX  
MAY 26 1983  
FEB 18 1986

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1)  
DATE 01-07-2016 BY: 276M45K62

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

**SECRET**

TO : Mr. Callahan

DATE: 2-13-62

FROM : C. R. Davidson

SUBJECT: WILLIAM K. HARVEY

Former Special Agent

(Resigned 8-22-47, to seek other employment.)

9-17-03 PRC 007A 2nd Ed. 9-20-03 E-3 PRC 58 E-34 PRC 1, P-2 remain classified (65)  
This is a brief summary of Mr. Harvey's record for the  
Director's use. PRC 60290 659/10/16 8-21-03 CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60290 659/10/16  
#981541 as marked DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1-981541

Mr. Harvey entered on duty with the Bureau on 12-9-40, as a Special Agent and advanced in grade and salary to CAF-12, \$6623.40 per annum. He served in the New York and Pittsburgh Offices and he served as a Supervisor at the Seat of Government in the Domestic Intelligence Division from 3-27-42, until 8-22-47, when he resigned to seek other employment. His personnel file reflects he was assigned to various sections, he was considered an excellent Bureau representative who possessed a keen analytical mind and he appeared to be especially adapted to intelligence work involving German espionage. He received only one letter of censure during his Bureau service; however, since leaving the Bureau, his inadequate handling of several Bureau cases had come to the Bureau's attention. A record of each of these instances were made a matter of record in his personnel file.

Since Mr. Harvey's resignation, the Bureau has had dealings with him on a limited basis in liaison <sup>matters</sup> at the Central Intelligence Agency. It was felt Harvey was unfriendly and hostile toward the Bureau and CIA was so advised. His attitude was subsequently friendly and cooperative; however, the Director noted, "I doubt if he has ever changed his basic hostility towards the FBI." It is noted that Harvey was employed by CIA following his resignation from the Bureau.

In September, 1952, it was noted CIA was most anxious to recruit into its service key FBI personnel and it was rumored there were two individuals within the CIA who were particularly anxious to do so. One was former SA William K. Harvey. It was understood he would utilize any device to proselyte former Bureau personnel and would even go so far as to approach former Bureau personnel presently with CIA to go out and make contact with present and former Bureau employees to entice them with offers of higher grades to go to CIA. The Director noted, "There is absolutely no question but there is a very definite and intensive effort being made by CIA to proselyte key Bureau personnel and they are approaching our staff in violation of all agreements and decency."

Harvey was in charge of CIA's Berlin Office and by letter dated 10-22-58, [the Legal Attaches of London, Madrid, Paris, Rome, and Bonn] were alerted to his unfriendly and hostile attitude toward the Bureau and were instructed to be most circumspect in any contact with him.

ATTACHMENT (Permanent Brief) FDH:11t (2)

**SECRET**

FEB 13 1986

3/100

~~SECRET~~

RE: WILLIAM K. HARVEY  
Former Special Agent

b1 Per CIA  
b3

(U) ~~As of 2-12-62, information reflected that a new division had been established at CIA which was called "Western Hemisphere, Division #4, and was headed by Harvey who had completely dismantled the administrative setup which previously existed in the [redacted] He had selected new personnel and was implementing new procedures.~~ (S)

It is noted that Mr. Harvey's name appears in the 1961 Membership Directory of the Society of Former Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

~~SECRET~~



# The American Tobacco

~~SECRET~~

Date: ~~NOV 16 1963~~ April 16, 1963

Subject: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) OPERATIONS

On 4/11/63

[redacted] advised he has received orders of transfer to Washington, D. C., effective July 10, 1963. [redacted] is scheduled to attend the Army War College, Fort McNair, Washington, D. C., after his arrival in the United States. He expects to attend the school in behalf of CIA for several months prior to receiving another CIA assignment. (S) (u) 1

[redacted] further related William "Bill" Harvey, a  
 former Special Agent of the FBI, has been ordered to replace [redacted] b1  
 [redacted] Harvey is expected to arrive b3  
 [redacted] on April 24, 1963, for a three-weeks period of briefing  
 and review in the CIA operation in this area. He will thereafter  
 return to the United States and accompany his family back to [redacted] b7C  
 for the assignment. [redacted] related Harvey was a Special Agent  
 with the FBI until approximately 1946 or 1947, when he was employed  
 by CIA. Harvey was described as short of stature, slightly obese  
 with "poppy" eyes. (S) (X) (u)

Also related Mr. John A. McCone, CIA Director, is scheduled to arrive in [redacted] on April 30, 1962, on official business. He will be accompanied by [redacted] Chief of the West Europe Desk, Thomas Karamessines [redacted] and now a top CIA official in Washington; an unnamed CIA expert on Finland matters [redacted] and possibly others not identified. McCone and his group are expected to remain in [redacted] approximately three days, during which time meetings will be held with CIA Chiefs of Station from African countries [redacted] According to [redacted] Mr. McCone and his group were also scheduled for visits [redacted]

- 3 - Bureau (1 - Liaison Section) (archived -)  
1 - Legat, Bonn (Inf.) (sent direct)  
1 - Legat, Paris (inf.) (sent direct)  
1 - Rome 66-26 (X) SEE REVERSE

MG: RAA  
(6)

~~SEE REVERSE  
SIDE FOR  
CLASSIFICATION  
ACTION~~

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Tolson ✓  
Mr. Belmont ✓  
Mr. Mohr ✓  
Mr. Casper ✓  
Mr. Callahan ✓  
Mr. b1 Per CIA  
Mr. b3 att  
Mr. Evans  
Mr. Gale  
Mr. Rosen ✓  
Mr. Sullivan ✓  
Mr. Tavel  
Mr. Trotter  
Tele. Room  
Miss Holmes  
Miss Gandy  
-b1 Per CIA-  
-b3

b3

b1

b3

b1 Per CIA

b3

b1 Per CIA

 $\epsilon_{b,3}$ 

CLASSIFIED BY: 275202401  
DECLASSIFY ON: 28 Nov 1995

~~CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED  
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)~~

(U)

(U)

(U)

45 (h)



~~SECRET~~

Letter to Bureau

66-26

b1 Per CIA

b3

Above being furnished for information of Bureau.

Also being furnished for information of Legats

b1 Per CIA

since McCone and his group are scheduled for stops in areas covered by Legats

b3

In the event McCone or any member of his group contacts Legats they will be courteously received. No matters of policy will be discussed.

b1 Per CIA  
b3

Bureau requested to make available information in files on William "Bill" Harvey for information since Harvey has been assigned as the new

b1 Per CIA

b3

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

b1 Per CIA  
b3

RECORDED



~~SECRET~~

April 24, 1963

Director, FBI (67-163897)

~~SECRET~~  
WILLIAM KING HARVEY  
FORMER SPECIAL AGENT

*D. J. [Signature]*

Reurlet 4-16-63 captioned (Relations With Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Operation [Redacted])

b1 Per CIA  
b3

Harvey entered on duty in the Bureau 12-9-40 as a Special Agent and voluntarily resigned 8-22-47. In the same year he became employed by CIA. In 1960 the Bureau received information indicating he was unfriendly and hostile toward the Bureau. In September, 1952, a Bureau official reported that he was engaged in the proselyting of Bureau personnel for CIA. He was formerly head of CIA operations in Berlin.

You should be most circumspect in any contact which you may have with him.

b1 Per CIA  
b3

For the information of offices designated copies of this communication, Mr. Harvey has been [Redacted]

- RLC:ccf (9)
- 1 - Bonn
  - 1 - Paris
  - 1 - Bern
  - 1 - London
  - 1 - Madrid

MAILED 30  
APR 25 1963  
COMM-FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Classified by *Multiple Sources - Bjo/and*  
Declassify on: OADR 3/14/86  
*per release 267100*

- 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit

NOTE: It is noted (Legats) were previously advised of Harvey's service record in 10-58; however, Mr. Ferris, Foreign Liaison Unit, advised ticklers are only kept from 3 to 5 years by foreign offices and therefore new summary being furnished.

~~SECRET~~  
APR 30 1966  
~~SECRET~~

FEB 18 1986

MAY 1 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

APR 24 1963  
CIVIL ACT. # 12350  
E.O. # 3/14/86  
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Memorandum

**SECRET**

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 6-21-63

FROM : C. A. Evans

SUBJECT: JOHN ROSELLI  
ANTI-RACKETEERING

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Classified by 5/1/89  
Declassify on: OADR 3/4/86

John Roselli is a leading hoodlum in the Los Angeles area with important connections in Las Vegas gambling casinos. On the evening of June 20, 1963, the Los Angeles Office developed information indicating Roselli was departing from Los Angeles for Washington, D. C., under an assumed name of J. Ralston. Upon arrival in Washington, D. C., it was determined Roselli was met by an individual later identified as William K. Harvey, former Bureau Agent and now with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (S-1) (X) U

The Liaison Section determined from CIA that CIA is utilizing Roselli in connection with Cuban matters. (S-1) (X) U

It is known that CIA approximately two years ago had enlisted the aid of Chicago hoodlum Sam Giancana in a plan to neutralize Cuban leader Fidel Castro. In this connection we determined that former Bureau Agent Robert Maheu, presently conducting private investigations, was utilized by CIA as an intermediary. While we have no specific proof of this, we believe that the approach to Giancana by CIA was made by Maheu through Roselli. (S-1) (X) U

ACTION:

[Papich of the Liaison Section is obtaining full details of CIA's interest in Roselli this morning.] You will be advised of further developments in this connection.

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Papich

Classified by 2/5/89  
Declassify on: OADR 5/11/89  
REC-73

CHS:sma sma  
(7)

FOI/PA # 2672120  
APPEAL #  
CIVIL ACT. #  
E.O. # 12336  
DATE 3/1/86

6-21-63  
67-NOT RECORDED  
3 JUL 15 1963

**SECRET**

ST-115

MAY 26 JUL 2 1963

PERS. REC. UNIT  
FEB 18 1964

DECLASSIFIED BY 6123 MCH/AG  
ON 6-17-91



EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1)  
DATE 01-07-2016 BY: F76M45K62

THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The American Embassy

~~SECRET~~

b1 Per CIA  
b3

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED  
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRO)  
DATE: 5-8-91

Date: July 11, 1963  
To: Director, FBI (62-80750)  
From: [Redacted] (66-26)  
Subject: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)

*Handwritten:* Personal Record  
(Phone call in O.S. 1/21)  
w. K. Harvey  
1/17/63  
b1 Per CIA  
b3

Rebulet, 4-24-63, captioned "WILLIAM KING  
HARVEY, Former Special Agent". (S)(X)(U)

The meeting with Mr. HARVEY was most  
amiable and he stated that his office would continue  
to cooperate with this office to the fullest extent  
possible as has been done in the past. (S)(X)(U)

Mr. HARVEY gave no indication of being  
unfriendly or hostile toward the Bureau, but this  
office will certainly be most circumspect in its  
contact with him at the outset. (S)(X)(U)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

JUL 19 1963

REC-24 62-80750-4120

3 - Bureau (66-26)  
1 - [Redacted]

Foreign Liaison Section

APR 30 1986

67-NOT RECORDED  
1 AUG 2 1963

~~SECRET~~

PERS. REC. UNIT

FEB 18 1986

b1 Per CIA  
b3

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. Rosen

**SECRET**

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5/4/67

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: JOHN ROSELLI  
ANTI-RACKETEERING

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Tolson ☒  
DeLoach ☒  
Mohr ☐  
Wick ☐  
Casper ☐  
Callahan ☐  
Conrad ☐  
Felt ☐  
Gale ☒  
Rosen ☒  
Sullivan ☒  
Tavel ☐  
Trotter ☐  
Tele. Room ☐  
Holmes ☐  
Gandy ☐

The subject is a member of the Chicago "family" of La Cosa Nostra, who has represented their interests in Las Vegas and on the west coast. [We previously have received information concerning past contacts between Roselli and representatives of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This was an association which developed in connection with CIA's abortive plan to assassinate Fidel Castro. After CIA's involvement was embarrassingly exposed, the Agency allegedly discontinued any operational relationship with Roselli.]

[On 5/3/67, John Earman, Inspector General, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that on 5/2/67 William Harvey of CIA received a telephone call from Roselli, who was on the west coast, at which time the subject stated that he was coming to Washington in the near future and that he would be in contact with Harvey. He furnished no further details. Earman advised that CIA has instructed Harvey to avoid contact with subject if possible. CIA realizes that Roselli may force a contact and it will be impossible for Harvey to evade the subject. Earman has advised that if contact is made Harvey is to furnish the results which will be passed on to the Bureau.]

For your information, Harvey, former Bureau Agent, is currently on Sick Leave. At the termination of this leave, he goes into retirement. He, therefore, is essentially separated from Agency employment. [He did have contacts with Roselli during some of the period that the Agency was involved with the subject.]

[As previously pointed out, CIA is in an extremely vulnerable position. Roselli and associates]

XEROX

REC-8

APR 30 1967

MAY 8 1967

Classified by SP6 [signature]  
Declassify on: OADR 3/14/86

**SECRET**

KEROX  
FEB 18 1966

PERS REC UNIT

FOI/PA # 267,100  
APPEAL #  
CIVIL ACT. #  
E.O. # 12350  
DATE 5/14/86 INITIALS [signature]

SJP MAY 15 1967  
(8)

EX-110

67 MAY 16 1967

CONTINUED-OVER

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum D. J. Brennan, Jr. to W. C. Sullivan  
RE: JOHN ROSELLI  
ANTI-RACKETEERING

~~TOP SECRET~~

[such as Sam/Giancanna continue to be in a position to  
publicly embarrass CIA. (S-1) ~~TOP SECRET~~ 2/7/89

ACTION:

For your information. The Liaison Agent will,  
follow with [Earman] in order to obtain the results of any  
contact which subject may have with Harvey (S-1) ~~TOP SECRET~~ 2/7/89

*[Handwritten signature]*

*W.C.S.*

*[Handwritten initials]*

*AS*

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : MR. TOLSON *in w/att*

FROM : C. D. DeLoach

SUBJECT: WILLIAM K. HARVEY  
Former Special Agent  
EOD 12/9/40;  
Resigned 8/22/47

DATE: 6/12/69

cc Mr. DeLoach  
Mr. Sullivan  
Mr. Bishop  
Mr. D.E. Moore  
Mr. Stukenbroeker

Tolson ☒  
DeLoach ☒  
Mohr ☐  
Bishop ☐  
Casper ☐  
Callahan ☐  
Conrad ☐  
Felt ☐  
Gale ☐  
Rosen ☒  
Sullivan ☒  
Tavel ☐  
Trotter ☐  
Tele. Room ☐  
Holmes ☐  
Gandy ☐

Former SA Bill Harvey called. He resigned from the Bureau 8/22/47; was later employed by CIA, and has recently retired from CIA. *reminis unclear per CIA let 2/7/89*

Harvey advised me that John Barron, of Reader's Digest, had contacted him relative to obtaining information for a book Reader's Digest is preparing on Soviet espionage. Harvey desires to cooperate with Barron but first wished to go on record with the FBI that he would do this only with the stipulation that the final manuscript be presented both to the FBI and CIA, for editing purposes. Harvey wanted to know what I thought of Barron.

I told Harvey that Barron had written several articles concerning the FBI and that we had always found him to be a most pleasant, top-flight writer. His recent article concerning the FBI's handling of the KKK in the South was a great credit to the FBI.

I told Harvey I would be glad to make his call a matter of record; however, inasmuch as he (Harvey) had been employed by CIA for a number of years, we of course could not be placed in the position of granting him permission to cooperate with authors concerning foreign intelligence work. Harvey stated he understood this and merely wished to go on record about this, and the fact that he probably would talk with Barron.

For record purposes.

CDD:CSH(6)

*EX-101*  
**ACTION**  
**MAY 6 1969**

**9861 9 MAY**  
**TOHMY**

**JUN 18 1969**

**APR 30 1986**

**MAY 26 1983**

**FEB 18 1986**

*300 2/10/69 47*



~~SECRET~~

August 17, 1967

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Mr. C. R. Locke,  
Director  
National Conference of Bar  
Examiners  
1155 East 60th Street  
Chicago, Illinois 60637

Dear Mr. Locke:

Receipt is acknowledged of your inquiry of  
August 8, 1967, regarding Mr. William King Harvey.

Mr. Harvey entered on duty in the Federal  
Bureau of Investigation December 9, 1940, as a  
Special Agent. After a period of training, he per-  
formed investigative and supervisory duties. He  
voluntarily resigned effective August 22, 1947.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

FOI/PA # 267,100  
APPEAL #  
CIVIL ACT. #  
E.O. # 12356  
DATE 3/14/86 INITIALS mdk

tcs  
(3)  
67-168897

After leaving FBI Harvey was hired by CIA. In 1950, we  
learned he was unfriendly and hostile toward the Bureau.  
On 9-10-52, he was reported to be proselyting FBI personnel  
CIA. He headed CIA operations in Berlin, later in [redacted] (c)  
and on 5-4-67, we learned he had applied for retirement  
from CIA. No comment is being made concerning quality of his  
services and character in view of the above, although, while  
with the Bureau in 1940-47, his work had been satisfactory.

b1 Per CIA  
b3

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Bishop \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

FEB 18 1986

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: November 7, 1967

~~SECRET~~

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

1 - Mr. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. Sullivan  
1 - Mr. Gale  
1 - Mr. McAndrews  
1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. Papich

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: JOHN ROSELLI  
ANTI-RACKETEERING

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Bishop \_\_\_\_\_  
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Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
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Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
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Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

## SYNOPSIS:

William Harvey, former Bureau Agent and retired Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee, met with Agent Papich on November 6, 1967. Harvey described his recent conversations with Roselli. Roselli asked Harvey to act as his legal counsel, and Harvey claims he turned him down. Subject did indicate that he might need somebody to intercede in his behalf in connection with the recent indictment returned against him. Harvey expressed opinion that case against subject was weak. He inquired if Agent could make any observations regarding case. Harvey was told that this definitely could not be done now or in the future. The subject may come to Washington, D. C., within the next week or two; Harvey states he will keep us advised regarding developments.

## ACTION:

For information.

## DETAILS:

Reference is made to my memorandum dated November 1, 1967. Set forth are the results of a meeting which Special Agent Papich held with William Harvey on November 6, 1967.

[Harvey stated that Roselli telephonically contacted him from Los Angeles on or about October 22, 1967, to advise that he was indicted on a charge of failure to register as an

SJP:clb  
(7)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONTINUED OVER

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED UNIT

SIN CIA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-16-88 BY SP4/ML/STP/960

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-16-88 BY SP4/ML/STP/960

NOV 24 1967  
APR 30 1968  
XEROX

REC 18 72-3267-868

DECLASSIFIED BY 8123 MCH/AC  
ON 6-4-91  
per CFA let 4-12-91 NOV 16 1967

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: JOHN ROSELLI

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[alien. Roselli wanted to know if Harvey could serve as his legal counsel. Harvey told subject that this was impossible. Subject made it quite clear that he was concerned and that he might need somebody to intercede in his behalf. Harvey subsequently received a newspaper clipping from subject which referred to the aforementioned indictment.

(S-1) (X) U per CIA let 2/7/89

Roselli again contacted Harvey by telephone on or about October 27, 1967. Subject reiterated his concern but at the same time indicated that the case against him was weak. He left the impression with Harvey that this assessment of the case came from subject's attorney, Cantallon, (phonetic) in Los Angeles. Roselli stated that an attorney named "Breen" (phonetic) has been very helpful to Cantallon. Roselli again asked if Harvey could act as his legal counsel, and Harvey told him this could not be done. Roselli stated that he had been in contact with Ed Morgan, and Harvey surmises that Morgan will end up acting as Roselli's attorney in Washington, D. C.

(S-1) (X) U per CIA let 2/7/89

Subject commented that he could not see why charges against him could not be dropped as they had been in the Government case against Robert Maheu. Roselli was referring to the wire tapping charge against Maheu which occurred a few years ago. Roselli stated that Ed Morgan was fully aware of the maneuvering which saved Maheu. Subject further indicated that Morgan obviously had been fully briefed concerning CIA's relationship with Roselli, and this had been done by Maheu.

(S-1) (X) U per CIA let 2/7/89

Harvey volunteered his opinion (this could be his opinion or he could be furnishing the evaluation made by Roselli) that the case was weak; that the subject could easily establish there was no willful intent to violate any law; and that if subject had known that he had another identity, he easily could have rectified the situation by becoming a United States citizen after serving in the United States Army during World War II.

(S-1) (X) U per CIA let 2/7/89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: JOHN ROSELLI

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Harvey inquired if Agent Papich could make any observations regarding the current case against subject. Papich told Harvey that this very definitely could not be done; that the Agent had no idea regarding the nature of the evidence collected; and that he specifically had made a point of not having access to such information. The Agent emphasized that Harvey must clearly understand that his relationship with Roselli placed him in a quasi counsel position and that no Bureau Agent could discuss the substance of the case with Harvey. Harvey stated that he was not seeking any information, but he did want to know if there is anything that he could be told which might assist him in following developments with Roselli. The Agent reiterated that Harvey could not expect anything from him now or in the future, but Harvey was free to volunteer any information if he so desired. Harvey stated that he knew where he stood and that he would be guided accordingly. (S-1) (K) 2/7/89

Harvey stated that Roselli would be in town within the next week or two and that he would keep the Agent advised of any developments. Agent Papich inquired if Roselli was cognizant of Harvey's contact with a Bureau Agent. Harvey replied, "definitely not." (S-1) (K) per FAX 2/7/89

*h w 2/7/89*  
*Please vigorously*  
*h*

*P/B per w sat*

~~SECRET~~

~~- 3 -~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

## SECRET

1 - Mr. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. Sullivan

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 11/1/67

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

1 - Mr. Gale  
1 - Mr. McAndrews  
1 - Liaison

SUBJECT: JOHN ROSELLI  
ANTI-RACKETEERING

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SYNOPSIS

Declassify on: OADR

Subject, a top hoodlum, recently indicted and arrested on charges of failure to register as alien and failure to keep Attorney General advised of his whereabouts. Currently out on bail. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) established relationship with him about 1960 when Agency devised plan to assassinate, Fidel Castro through utilization of hoodlum element. Plan never implemented. Its existence continues to be potential source of embarrassment to CIA if plan is publicly exposed. Roselli is in position to blackmail CIA. William Harvey, former Bureau Agent now retired from CIA, was one of CIA officials who established relationship with subject. Relationship continues. Harvey periodically volunteers information to Special Agent Papich. Harvey met with Richard Helms, CIA, 10/30/67 and advised subject is seeking help as result of indictment; apparently looking to CIA to intercede in his behalf. Harvey's role in this situation definitely questionable. Helms advised SA Papich 10/31/67 that he mistrusts Harvey; that he is not going to permit himself or CIA to be blackmailed by anybody; and he has no fear of any threats which may emanate from subject.

DECLASSIFIED BY: 8123 MCH/AG

ACTION:

ON: 6-4-91  
REC-42

SA Papich has been adhering to a line of accepting any information Harvey volunteers. No information is given to Harvey. If approved, Agent Papich will continue accepting Harvey's information as he volunteers it.

SJP:kw  
(7)

We must be very careful in any meetings with Harvey.

CONTINUED - OVER

## SECRET

Tolson ✓  
DeLoach ✓  
Mohr ✓  
Casper ✓  
Callahan ✓  
Conrad ✓  
Felt ✓  
Gale ✓  
Rosen ✓  
Sullivan ✓  
Tavel ✓  
Trotter ✓  
Tele. Room ✓  
Holmes ✓  
Gandy ✓

TO: PA # 267100  
APPEAL #  
CIVIL ACT. #  
E.O. # 12356  
DATE 3/14/88 INITIALS: mch

DECLASSIFIED BY: 275 WWT/ty  
ON: 5-11-89  
CLASSIFIED BY: 275 WWT/ty  
ON: 5-11-89

NOV 14 1967

XEROX  
FEB 18 1968

FIRE. REG. UNIT

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: JOHN ROSELLI

~~SECRET~~

DETAILS:

(C) (S) (X) (K) The subject, a top hoodlum, was recently indicted and arrested on charges of failure to register as an alien and failure to keep the Attorney General advised of his whereabouts. He is currently out on bail. You previously have been informed concerning a relationship between the subject and the CIA which developed a few years ago when CIA concocted a plan to assassinate Fidel Castro. Utilization of certain U.S. hoodlum types was a key element of the plan which was never implemented. (S-1) (X) (K) per CIA let 2/7/89

[William Harvey, former Bureau Agent and now retired from CIA, was one of the CIA officials who established a relationship with Roselli. From time to time Harvey has volunteered information to Special Agent Sam Papich, which data Harvey has obtained from what appears to be occasional contacts with subject. Harvey also contacts CIA officials and maintains that he has not been able to sever the relationship with the subject for fear that Roselli might become antagonized and consequently become a problem. In this connection Roselli is in a position to hurt CIA if he desires to expose his involvement with the Agency in the plot to assassinate Castro. He does have this hanging over CIA's head. (S-1) (X) (K) per CIA let 2/7/89

[On 10/27/67 Harvey telephonically contacted Agent Papich from New York City and stated that he wanted to confer with the Bureau Agent when he returned to Washington on or about 10/31/67. Harvey contacted Agent Papich on the morning of 10/31/67 and asked for a meeting. The Agent has indicated that he would try to see him later in the week. (S-1) (X) (K) per CIA let 2/7/89

[In the meantime, Harvey has been in contact with CIA. Howard Osborn, Director of Security, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent on 10/30/67 that Harvey had met that morning with Osborn and Richard Helms, Director, CIA. At that meeting, Harvey stated that he had received a communication from subject concerning his indictment. (S-1) (X) (K) per CIA let 2/7/89

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: JOHN ROSELLI

~~SECRET~~

and arrest. According to Harvey, Roselli "is looking for help." Harvey told the CIA officials that subject obviously is probing to determine if CIA can intervene on his behalf. Harvey told Helms that he was seeking advice and guidance for his future contacts with subject. Helms told Harvey that he would give the matter some thought and would be in touch with him. (S-X)(S-1)(X) Per CIA let 2/1/89

[During the course of the conversation with the CIA officials, Harvey volunteered that he personally has had some contact with Ed Morgan, former Bureau Agent, who is practicing law in the D. C. area. Harvey explained that since he himself was admitted to the D. C. Bar in the very recent past, he was making a point of establishing contact with some lawyers in the area whom he personally knew. Harvey made the observation that Morgan obviously was very well informed concerning CIA's past relationship with Roselli. Harvey assumes that Morgan acquired this information from Robert Maheu, another former Bureau Agent, who was utilized by CIA when it initiated its contacts with the hoodlum elements for planning of the Castro assassination. (S-X)(S-1)(X) Per CIA let 2/1/89

[Osborn advised in strict confidence that he and Helms had very serious doubts that Harvey was divulging all information he possesses concerning subject. Osborn is confident that Harvey is holding out and possibly has become involved in some financial proposition with subject. (S-1)(X) Per CIA let 2/1/89

OBSERVATIONS:

[Harvey has been fully apprised of the dangers stemming from any association he may maintain with subject. He very clearly knows that Roselli is a top hoodlum and subject of a Bureau investigation. Harvey has indicated that he has no intention of becoming involved in any illegal or criminal activities and that he wants to cooperate fully with the Bureau. He has not asked for any information but has been careful to report his contacts with subject. Whether or not he has reported adequately is a matter of conjecture. It (S-1)(X) Per CIA let 2/1/89

~~SECRET~~



Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
RE: JOHN ROSELLI

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[should be noted that instead of withdrawing from a relationship with Roselli, he seems to be getting in deeper. His role in this situation is definitely questionable.] (S-1) (X) *puc CIA let 8/1/89*

[On 10/31/67 Richard Helms furnished Agent Papich essentially the same information as that made available by Osborn of CIA. Helms made it emphatically clear that he mistrusts Harvey; that he is not going to permit himself or CIA to be blackmailed by anybody; and that he has no fear of any threats which may emanate from subject. Helms commented that as far as he is concerned the Bureau can treat Harvey as it sees fit.] (S-1) (X) *4*

*puc CIA let  
2/1/89*

~~SECRET~~